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Abstract 
 
 
    The international community has made substantial improvement on poverty 
reduction in the past decades , which is largely driven by rapid economic 
growth. In the current global context of the growth slowdown, further poverty 
reduction cannot be realized without significant shifts in  reducing within-
country inequalities . Emerging evidence suggests that within-country 
inequality is rising, which is founded to  be negatively associated with poverty 
reduction, economic development as well as the stability of a country.  
    Despite the fact that Kenya is ranked as one of the most unequal countries in 
East Africa even in the world, inequality has received little attention and 
discussion both politically and academically before 2004. Extant studies find 
that there are great within-region and between-region inequalities in Kenya, 
while they only stop at descriptive statistics without decomposition of 
inequality measures at the sub-national level. 
    Inequality has traditionally been concerned  with outcomes in the standard of 
living such as income, education, and health. An alternative perspective is 
concerned with the inequality of opportunities, such as unequal access to 
public goods, facilities , and employment opportunity. Whether inequality in 
outcomes comes from inequality in opportunities has  not been explored yet  
under the Kenyan context  as well.  
    Using the selected indicators on education and access to basic public goods 
and services, this dissertation first shows that the overall developmental 
outcomes and inequality measures have been improved in the past decades  in 
Kenya utilizing household survey data from five rounds of the Kenyan 
Demographic and Health Survey (KDHS).  
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    The results of decomposition of inequality demonstrate that t he majority of 
the inequality is increasingly coming from within -region inequality; between-
region inequality has barely improved in the past several decades.  
    Kenya has experienced quite bloody episodes of ethnic conflict since its 
independence, and the conflict that raged in the aftermath of the 2007 election 
in Kenya remains vivid in many people ’s minds, raising question that whether 
it is related to the inequality in Ken ya.  
    Using the Uppsala Conflict Data Program Geo-referenced Dataset  and 
exploiting variations in drought conditions across time  within a certain district , 
this dissertation identifies the causal effect of drought on intrastate conflict 
through a panel data analysis. It also explores a drought-conflict nexus 
conditional on baseline measurement of social-economic factors and social 
divisions. The empirical results show that the drought -conflict nexus is 
conditional, with its strength substantially affected by the baseline 
measurement of access to unimproved water source and the ownership of land. 
Comparing the baseline measurement of access to improved water source with 
that in the 2014 KDHS reveals the fact that between-region inequality is barely 
improved, and regions with higher inequality have experienced more conflict. 
Between-region inequality may also enhance the drought-conflict nexus since 
non-state conflict increases in a certain district when its neighboring districts 
were hit by drought especially in arid areas. Thus, policy interventions aimed 
to reduce the within-region as well as between-region inequalities are urgently 
needed. 
    One striking feature of the regions in Kenya is that every region has a 
dominant ethnic group. It is generally believed that the post-independence 
presidents allocated resources in a way that favored their home regions or  their 
own ethnic groups. While it is not clear whether the better developmental 
outcomes in certain regions are  because the president only favors his own 
8 
ethnic group who is concentrated in certain regions or because he favors 
certain regions as a whole.  
    Given that education sector occupies the single largest expenditure share of 
the government account since independence, this dissertation then explores 
whether inequality in educational outcomes can be attributed to ethnic 
favoritism, and it goes beyond previous studies (e.g. Kramon and Posner 2016) 
by showing whether ethnic favoritism operates at the district -level or ethnic 
dimension utilizing individual-level data derived from five rounds of KDHS as 
well as population census. The estimated results show that  ethnic favoritism 
operates at the district-level, from both supply-side and demand-side 
mechanism. The supply-side mechanism of ethnic favoritism implies that 
inequality in educational outcomes may come from inequality in opportunity 
through inequality in the provision of basic opportunities (e.g. educational 
resources). In addition, ethnic favoritism in the job market affects the demand -
side mechanism of education, which implies that inequality in employment 
opportunities affects choice and effort of individuals, and subsequently, affects 
inequality in educational outcomes.  
    Following education, road sector is the second largest expenditure item in 
government expenditure. Thus, this dissertation then focuses on road 
expenditure and derives district level panel data on road expenditure from 
Burgess et al. (2015).  Utilizing a Difference-in-Differences strategy, this 
dissertation measures not only the effect of coethnicity with the president but 
also the effect of democratization on the extent of ethnic favoritism in road 
expenditure. It confirms that coethnic districts of the president get a 
disproportionate share of expenditures , which are in line with Burgess et al. 
(2015). While the advent of the multi-party election in 1992 failed to prevent 
the president from discriminating other districts  since more road expenditure 
went to districts with higher shares of turnout rates and swing voters.  These  
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results reflect that there is systematic inequality in the provision of basic 
opportunities like roads as well. 
    To sum up, the estimated results in Chapter 4 and 5 disclose that coethnic 
districts of the president have received more resources  and opportunities in 
terms of education and road construction. Thus, inequality in outcomes in 
Kenya is largely coming from inequality in opportunities, which is deeply 
driven by the relative political power of different ethnic groups.  Then how can 
we break the links between inequality in outcomes like education and 
inequality in opportunity? From the supply-side mechanism of education, the 
development community or the government can provide educational resources 
in unfavored regions to cut down inequality in opportunity coming from the 
unequal provision of public goods. From the demand-side mechanism of 
education, they can implement policies like conditional income transfers to 
improve the incentive of the households in the non -coethnic district to invest in 
their children’s human capital. Alternatively, the government can provide equal 
job opportunities to different ethnic groups through introducing civil service 
examinations to increase their expectations of educational returns . Besides, the 
government or the development community can help to  implement transparency 
reform in the allocation of public expenditure and in the process of public 
sector employment to reduce the inequality of opportunities in Kenya .  
10 
Chapter 1 Introduction 
 
1.1 Why Inequality Matters?  
    The international community has made substantial improvement on poverty 
reduction in the past decades. These achievements in poverty reduction are  
largely driven by rapid economic growth. Given that poverty reduction is 
typically realized by higher economic growth and/or inequality reduction, “the 
World Bank goal of eliminating extreme poverty by 2030  cannot be 
achieved…without significant shi fts in within-country inequalities” (World 
Bank Group, 2016:69) in the current global context of growth slowdown. The 
overall global inequality1 rose gradually until the early 1990s and has declined 
since then. Inequality between countries has  been declined, whereas within-
country inequality has risen (World Bank Group, 2016).   
    Most of the previous studies focus on within -country inequality since it is 
the main level at which the policy intervention occurs. There is a growing 
number of studies, which suggests that inequality has a negative impact not 
only on poverty reduction (Fosu, 2014), but also on economic development 
(Cingano, 2014; Ncube, Anyanwu, and Hausken, 2014), and the stability of a 
country (Bartusevičius, 2014) . Thus, this dissertation takes an instrumental 
perspective on inequality, considering that inequality matters  as a means to 
eradicate poverty as well as to promote sustainable and peaceful development.  
    Inequality has traditionally been concerned with outcomes in the standard of 
living such as income, education, and health. An alternative perspective is 
concerned with the inequality of opportunities , such as unequal access to 
public goods, facilities, and employment opportunity. On the one hand, unequal 
                                                        
1  Global inequality is defined as the income inequality among all people in the world 
regardless of their country of residence (World Bank Group, 2016).  
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outcomes may affect unequal access to opportunities. For example, higher 
income can provide people with a better opportunity to secure education and 
health. On the other hand, unequal opportunities may lead to unequal outcomes, 
for instance, their predetermined background variables like ethnicity, sex, or 
location of residence affect their final educational attainment or earnings in the 
job market.  Thus, these two concepts are interdependent so that the direction 
of causality cannot be identified (UNDP, 2014).  
 
Figure 1 Framework of Outcome Inequality Decomposition  
 
Note: This figure is created by the author based on Barros, Ferreira,  Vega, and  Chanduvi 
(2009: 31). 
 
    Inequality in opportunity can lead to inequality in outcomes, while the 
overall inequality in outcomes is not necessarily all coming from inequality in 
opportunity. Part of the outcome inequality results from effort and choice, 
which are under the control of the individuals to some extent  (see arrow (1) in 
Figure 1). While, outcome inequality may also arise from differences in 
circumstances (such as gender, race, ethnicity, birthplace) that the individuals 
12 
cannot be accountable for (see arrow (2) in Figure 1) (Barros, Ferreira, Vega, 
and Chanduvi, 2009). The framework of this dissertation keeps consistent with 
the egalitarian definition of equality of opportunity from Roemer (1998)
2
, 
considers “a society has equal opportuni ties when circumstances are not 
statistically associated with differences in important life  outcomes, nor directly, 
nor through affecting the choice set people face” (Barros, Ferreira, Vega, and  
Chanduvi, 2009:33). More specifically, inequality of outcomes is  not directly 
due to inequality of opportunity (arrow 2), or indirectly through affecting the 
choice and efforts of individuals  (through arrow (3) to arrow (1)).  
     Inequality of opportunity can arise from different sources. This dissertation 
focuses on inequality of opportunity arising from inequality of access or 
provision of basic opportunities. Following Barros, Ferreira, Vega, and 
Chanduvi (2009), basic opportunities denote the set of goods and services that 
are vitally important for the development of children such as access to 
education, basic infrastructure, health services etc., which will have a 
fundamental impact on future outcomes. Therefore, policies should be 
implemented to provide these basic opportunities universal ly to ensure that 
there are no systematic biases in their provision . 
 
1.2 Why Study Inequality under the Kenyan Context? 
    Despite the fact that “Kenya is ranked among the 10 most unequal countr ies 
in the world and the most unequal in East Africa” , inequality has received little 
attention and discussion both politically and academically (Society for 
International Development 2004: iii). Thus, there are limited official and 
academic publications concerning the situation of inequality in Kenya.  
                                                        
2
 The alternative view on inequality of opportunity is called “meritocratic”,  which “requires 
that people with identical levels of effort and choice enjoy identical outcomes (Barros,  
Ferreira,  Vega, and  Chanduvi,  2009: 29).  
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    It is generally agreed that Society for International Development  (SID) 
(2004) in collaboration with the Kenya National Bureau of Statistics (KNBS) 
provided the first comprehensive analyses of social as well as economic 
inequalities in Kenya in 2004.  Society for International Development  (2004) 
found that inequalities in Kenya were manifested in different forms and aspects, 
such as in income, employment, and access to basic socia l services (e.g. 
education, water, and sanitation) using traditionally standard measures (e.g. 
Gini Index) with a focus on vertical inequality . More recently, Njonjo (2013) 
provided the baseline measurement of regional (county-level) inequalities in 
Kenya and emphasized that there are great within as well as between-region 
inequalities in monetary (e.g. expenditure) and non-monetary measures (e.g. 
employment, education, energy, housing, water and sanitation).  
    However, analyses of these studies stop at descriptive statistics without 
decomposition of inequality measures  at the sub-national level. Additionally, it 
is not clear whether inequality in these outcomes comes from inequality i n 
opportunity, which is considered to be the aspect that urgently needs policy 
interventions. Moreover, survey data exploited in these report s came from 
different household surveys under different sampling frameworks, which 
cannot be compared over time.  
    In this dissertation, using Kenya as a case study, I first present the patterns 
of inequality measured by education and health indicators in Kenya over time 
in Chapter 2 using the Kenyan Demographic and Health Survey (KDHS). Then 
I proceed to show the causal effect of drought on conflict , which is founded to 
be conditional on both between-region and within-region inequalities in 
Chapter 3. Chapter 4 focuses on primary education outcomes and investigates 
whether inequality in educational outcomes comes from unequal opportunities 
due to ethnic favoritism. Chapter 5, subsequently, looks at road construction at 
the district level,  directly explores whether the allocation of government 
14 
expenditures are biased towards the coethnic district of the  president. At last, 
Chapter 6 summarizes and provides policy implications.  
15 
Chapter 2 Inequality in Kenya over Time 
    This chapter derives household level data from five rounds of KDHS, 
conducted in 1993, 1998, 2003, 2008, and 2014. The KDHS was conducted six 
times between 1989 and 2014; however , this chapter excludes the 1989 KDHS 
because the household questionnaire in the first round does not include the 
main variables of interest  in terms of accessing to basic serv ices. Both 1993 
and 1998 KDHS excluded the northern part of Kenya, which comprised about 4 
percent of the national population and oversampled 14 districts in the rural pa rt. 
The KDHS since 2003 becomes representative both at the national and 
provincial level.  
    On measuring the inequality of Kenya over time, this chapter mainly focuses 
on social-economic indicators instead of income for the following reasons. First, 
there is no high-quality household income/expenditure survey available to 
measure income inequality over time. Second, inequality in basic opportunities, 
especially access to basic goods and services plays a fundamental role in 
inequality in future outcomes.  
 
Table 1 Selected Social -Economic Variables in Kenya over Time 
 
Education Level  (years)  Access to  Improved Water  (%)  Infant  Mortal ity (deaths)  
Year Weighted  Unweighted  Weighted  Unweighted  Weighted  Unweighted  
1993 5.089 5.022 44.382 49.693 62 62 
1998 6.206 5.959 43.030 43.389 70 74 
2003 6.569 6.721 45.346 49.247 72 73 
2008 7.243 7.068 63.028 64.271 54 54 
2014 7.996 7.053 69.395 64.499 39 37 
Note: Author’s calculation is based on KDHS 1993 -2014. Sample weights are used when 
calculating the weighted average of selected  indicators.  Education level denotes the 
education of the household head in single years.  Access to improved water denotes the  
probability of accessing to improved drinking water source. Infant mortality denotes the 
number of deaths per 1000 live births  for five-year periods preceding the survey.  
 
    Table 1 displays the average of selected social-economic indicators in Kenya 
over time using the five rounds of KDHS, from which it is obvious that  
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different indicators demonstrate different patterns. In the past two decades, 
indicators such as the education level of the household head have been 
consistently improved, while access  to improved water source as well as infant 
mortality deteriorated in the late 1990s and then improved substantially 
recently.  
 
Table 2 Inequality Measures of Selected Social -Economic Variable in Kenya Over Time  
Year 1993 1998 2003 2008 2014 
Gini Index 
     Education of Household Head  0.480 0.414 0.406 0.366 0.327 
Access to Improved Water  0.556 0.570 0.547 0.370 0.306 
Generalized Entropy Index GE (2) 
    Education of Household Head  0.365 0.269 0.262 0.213 0.168 
Access to Improved Water  0.627 0.662 0.603 0.293 0.221 
Note: Author’s calculat ion is based on KDHS 1993-2014. Sample weights are used when 
calculating the weighted inequality measures of selected indicators.  
 
    Inequality measures of these indicators decrease correspondingly as the 
improvement of its average over time (see Table 2).   
    As mentioned before, Njonjo (2013) emphasized that there are great within- 
as well as between-region inequalities. To what extent, does the  inequality 
come from between- or within-region inequality? In order to answer this 
question, I decompose the inequality measure into within-province and 
between-province components, and the results are listed in Table 3  and Table 4. 
A common trend can be identified from Table 3 and Table 4 is that the majority 
of the inequality in these two indicators comes from within-province inequality, 
and its contribution rate is increasing over time. Different provinces 
demonstrate various levels of inequality. For instance, Nairobi is the least  
unequal region in terms of education of household head, as well as access to 
improved water sources. At more disaggregated level, namely at the county 
level, inequality measures exhibit even larger geographica l disparities as shown 
in Figure 2. 
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Table 3 Inequality Decomposition by Province, Education of Household Head  
 
2003 2008 2014 
Generalized Entropy Index GE (2)  
   Education of Household Head  0.262 0.213 0.168 
    Inequality Decomposition  
   Within-Province  0.234 0.186 0.151 
Between-Province  0.027 0.027 0.017 
    Generalized Entropy Index GE (2) by Province  
  Nairobi 0.092 0.065 0.051 
Central  0.184 0.153 0.110 
Coast  0.357 0.257 0.204 
Eastern 0.296 0.249 0.198 
Nayanza 0.231 0.193 0.149 
Rift Valley 0.302 0.207 0.198 
Western 0.247 0.191 0.171 
North-Eastern 4.899 2.382 2.614 
Note: Author’s calculation is based on KDHS 2003 -2014. The KDHS 2003 was the first  
survey, which is  representative at the national as well as at the provincial level.  Thus, this 
chapter  excludes the KDHS conducted before 2003 when decomposing inequality measures 
by province. Sample weights are used when calculating the weighted inequality measures.  
 
Table 4 Inequality Decomposition by Province, Access to Improved Water  
 
2003 2008 2014 
Generalized Entropy Index GE (2)  
  
Improved Water  0.603 0.293 0.221 
    Inequality Decomposition  
   Within-Province  0.512 0.273 0.207 
Between-Province  0.091 0.020 0.014 
    Generalized Entropy Index GE (2) by Province  
  Nairobi 0.043 0.023 0.046 
Central  0.404 0.224 0.127 
Coast  0.319 0.272 0.215 
Eastern 0.687 0.478 0.383 
Nayanza 1.357 0.450 0.291 
Rift Valley 0.757 0.370 0.313 
Western 1.400 0.174 0.146 
North-Eastern 3.866 0.220 0.456 
Note: Author’s calculation is based on KDHS 2003 -2014. Sample weights are used when 
calculating the weighted inequality measures.  
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    To sum up, using the five rounds of KDHS with a focus on social -economic 
indicators, this chapter demonstrates that the overall developmental outcomes 
and inequality measures have been improved over time for all of the selected 
social-economic indicators in Kenya. The majority of these inequalities comes 
from within-province inequality, whose contribution ratio is consistently 
increasing. Different region in Kenya demonstrates different degrees in 
inequality.  
  
Figure 2 Inequality Measure of Education of Household Head  and Access to Improved Water 
by County, 2014 
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Note: Author’s calculat ion is based on KDHS 2014.  Sample weights are used when 
calculating the weighted inequality measures.  
 
    As mentioned earlier that, inequality is founded to have a negative effect on 
conflict. Even though the 2013 Kenyan election  witnessed a peaceful political 
transition, the conflict that raged in the aftermath of the 2007 election in Kenya 
remains vivid in many people’s minds , raising questions that whether it is 
related to the inequality in Kenya. However, inequality consistently exists, 
while conflict breaks out sporadically. If inequality matters for the breakout of 
the conflict, under what conditions, inequality will breed conflict, and which 
aspect of inequality matters? This dissertation gives answers to these questions 
in the following Chapter.   
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Chapter 3 Drought, Inequality and Intrastate Conflict  
 
3.1 Introduction 
    The post–Cold War period witnessed a decreasing number of armed conflicts, 
and most of the conflicts that did arise were within rather than betw een states 
using at least 25 conflict -related deaths within a year as the threshold , as 
shown in Figure 3(a). Even though the number of countries engaging in armed 
conflict has declined since 1990s (see Figure 3(a)), the number of incidents of 
conflict, which resulted at least one death  has been rising, especially in Africa, 
the world’s poorest continent (see Figure 3(b)). Africans have suffered not only 
from state-based conflicts (namely civil war), which indicates rebellion against  
the government, but also from ones involving other kinds of organized groups  
such as non-state conflict, which refers to a conflict between two organized but 
non-government armed groups, and one-sided violence, which is action taken 
against civilians by the government or a formally organized group (Croicu and 
Sundberg, 2017). 
 
Figure 3 Number of Conflicts and Incidents of Various Kinds of Armed Conflict  
 
Note: Figure 3(a) is based on the Uppsala Confl ict Data Program/Peace Research Institute 
Oslo (UCDP/PRIO) Armed Conflict Dataset,  version 17.1; Figure 3(b) is based on the 
Uppsala Conflict Data Program Geo -referenced Dataset (UCDP GED), Version 5.0.  
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According to the codebook of Allansson, Melander, & Themnér, (2017: 9 ), “Extrasystemic 
armed conflict occurs between a state and a non -state group outside its own 
territory…Interstate armed conflict occurs between two or more states…Internal armed  
conflict occurs between the government of a state and one or more internal  opposition 
group(s) without intervention from other states…Internationalized internal armed conflict  
occurs between the government of a state and one or more internal opposition group(s) with 
intervention from other states…”  
 
    Although Kenya has experienced quite bloody episodes of ethnic conflict 
since gaining its independence, it has remained free from large -scale state-
based conflict. This feature makes Kenya an unusual case in Africa, where two -
thirds of all countries have suffered from civil war since the 1960s (Blattman 
and Miguel, 2010). This special feature eliminates the possibility that other  
kinds of intrastate conflict, namely non-state conflict and one-sided violence, 
were a spillover or legacy from a large -scale civil war.  Therefore, the 
identification of causal mechanisms between other factors and intrastate 
conflicts becomes easier .  
 
Figure 4 Incidence of Intrastate Conflict,  Elections, and Drought in Kenya  
 
Note: The figure is based on UCDP GED Version 5.0 and the Global Standardized 
Precipitation-Evapotranspiration Index (SPEI) database. The vertical solid l ine in Figure 4(a) 
denotes the years when multi -party elections were held during this period. The positive and 
negative values of SPEI3 in Figure 4(b) identify wet and dry events in Kenya , and the 
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absolute value of SPEI3 denote s the intensity of wetness or dryness .  The calculation of 
drought indicator,  SPEI3 is described in the met hodology section of this chapter .  
 
    One common type of conflict in Kenya has been pre- or post-election 
violence. As Figure 4(a) shows, the peaks in one-sided violence have coincided 
with election years, whereas the distribution of non -state conflicts has varied 
over time. Kahl (2006) emphasized that violence around elections is not a 
purely political matter and that the key issues resulting in conflict may be 
demographic or environmental in nature, such as growing population density or 
drought. Additionally, Mkutu (2008) argued that drought is associated with the 
pastoral violence in Kenya. Figure 4(b) displays the drought indicators, SPEI3 
and the incidence of conflict by category in Kenya over time. The positive and 
negative values of SPEI3 identify the wet and dry events respectivel y. Drought 
has coincided with peaks in both non-state conflict and one-sided violence (as 
in 2000), but this relation has not been consistent over time.  
 
Figure 5 Geographical Distribution of Intrastate C onflict in Kenya, 1989–2015 
 
Note: I created these maps based on UCDP GED Version 5.0.  
 
    Conflict in Kenya is heterogeneous not only over time but also with regard to 
space. Figure 5 describes the geographical distribution of two types of intrastate 
23 
conflicts. The non-state conflict has been largely concentrated in Kenya’s 
humid and arid areas, whereas one-sided violence has occurred predominantly 
in the humid area. How can we explain this heterogeneity  of conflict in both 
time and space? It is an empirical question to understand the factors and 
conditions, which motivate people to engage in conflicts.  
    In recent years, an increasing number of studies have examined the security 
implications of climate change. Evidence thus far indicates that climate change 
(as operationalized by short -term anomalies in precipitation, temperature, or 
both) increases the risk of conflict (Burke, Hsiang, and Miguel, 2015) . The 
anticipated rising temperatures and greater unpredictability of rainfall 
associated with climate change also create a likelihood of more frequent 
drought and crop failure (Theisen, Holtermann, and Buhaug, 2012), which 
could breed heightened conflict over scarce resources, especially in countries 
that rely heavily on rain-fed agriculture such as those in sub-Saharan Africa. 
According to D’Alessandro et al. (2015), despite the fac t that Kenya has 
achieved high economic growth, agriculture still accounts for more than 25 
percent of the GDP and 70 percent of the jobs in rural areas. Therefore, its 
reliance on smallholder, rain-fed agriculture makes Kenya particularly 
vulnerable to climate risks.  
    Drought is considered to be one of the most severe natural hazards in Kenya 
since although “droughts have always occurred at five or six year intervals, in 
recent decades they have happened more frequently” , which affected almost 70 
percent of Kenya’s land mass (Owuor 2015:11). Therefore, this chapter focuses 
on drought and empirically investigates  the effect of drought on intrastate 
conflict. 
    In the rest of this chapter , I will first review previous literature. Next, I will 
outline a conceptual framework and hypotheses, along with the methodology 
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and data used to verify these hypotheses. I will then present the empirical 
evidence and draw conclusions.  
 
3.2 Literature Review  
    As noted above, changes in precipitation and/or temperature, widely linked 
to global climate change, have appeared to increase the risk of various types of 
conflict, from the interpersonal level to the intergroup level (Burke, Hsiang, 
and Miguel, 2015). The impact of climate change on human security and 
development differs by region, but in Africa, climate change has entailed 
warming and drying trends since the middle of the 20th century (Gan et al., 
2016). Therefore, in this literature review, I focus on the effect of drought on 
conflict in the African context  especially in Kenya, since drought-induced crop 
failure or pasture loss, as well as water shortages, may exacerbate rivalries 
over resources and may also reduce opportunity cost for laborers, consequently 
resulting in conflict.  
 
3.2.1 Drought and Intrastate Conflict: Qualitative Studies  
    Prior qualitative studies have found inconsistent results regarding the effect 
of drought on the conflict  in Kenya. Witsenburg and Adano (2009) documented 
increasing cooperation during the dry period in the Marsabit district, whereas 
Ember et al. (2012) described opposite findings in the Turkana district.  
    If a conflict in a certain district is between local communities, the effect of 
drought-induced resource scarcity may depend on the severity of drought 
conditions. However, the conflict in a particular geographic area frequently pits 
a local community against one in a neighboring district. Case studies showed 
that residents of the Pokots and Marsabit districts raided bordering villages in 
Turkana district in an effort to gain control over resources available in Turkana 
(Pragya, 2012). Thus, increasing conflict in a certain district may result from 
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the presence of more severe drought in a neighboring district. Under this 
circumstance, a spatial inconsistency between the drought and the conflict 
occurs due to the mobility of pastoralists.  
    The conflict between pastoralists may be driven not only by the scarcity of 
water and suitable pasture but also by cattle raiding, which has evolved from a 
customary practice into a more commercially motivated enterprise (Detges, 
2014). Previous research showed that  conflict increased during the wet period 
because thick vegetation and abundant water made livestock raiding easier 
(Raleigh and Kniveton, 2012).  
    To sum up, the results of qualitative studies show that drought may increase 
conflict over scarce resources but may also decrease conflict over cattle raiding. 
The mobility of pastoralists further complicates the effect of drought since the 
conflict in a certain district may be influenced by drought conditions in its 
neighboring districts.  
 
3.2.2 Drought and Intrastate Conflict: Quantitative Studies  
    Both qualitative and quantitative studies have not yet uncovered systematic 
evidence to verify the proposed drought -conflict nexus. 
    The most disaggregated unit of study has been at the 0.5 -degree
3
 pixel level. 
Theisen, Holtermann, and Buhaug (2012) found no direct relation between the 
drought and the onset of civil war, in general , or even in politically 
marginalized areas. At the same spatial resolution level, Von Uexkull (2014) 
failed to find a significant relationship between drought in the previous year 
and conflict but presented evidence that civil conflict is more likely to break 
out in areas dominated by rain-fed agriculture.  
    Using conflict data from the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data 
Project at the 1-degree pixel level , Harari and La Ferrara (2013) found that 
                                                        
3
 One degree at the equator is approximately equal to 110 kilometers.   
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weather-related shocks during the current year’s growing season had no impact 
on violence against civilians, but that weather -related shocks in the bordering 
eight cells (more specifically, a circle drawn around the cell’s center with a 
radius of 180 km) significantly increased the incidence of violence. A t the 
country level, Couttenier and Soubeyran (2014)  found that in general, the 
positive link between drought (as measured by the Palmer Drought Se verity 
Index) and the civil war was not robust. Regardless of that, countries with high 
scores on the ethnic fractionalization index were highly prone to conflict when 
hit by droughts (Couttenier and Soubeyran, 2014). 
    One pattern apparent in the seemingly contradictory evidence is that the 
effect of drought on conflict is not significant in more spatially disaggregated 
units. A possible explanation for this pattern is that drought -induced conflict 
does not necessarily break out in the places where drought conditions are the 
most severe (Detges, 2014). Especially in arid or semi-arid areas, a pastoralist 
may travel more than 300 kilometers in search of grazing land or water 
resources (Pragya, 2012), which—when converted to the measure used in 
previous studies—is equivalent to five adjacent 0.5-degree pixel cells.  
    Another possible explanation lies in the inconsistency between the method 
of measuring drought and the potential causal mechanism being tested. Most 
previous studies in Africa have sought to verify the opportunity cost effect ; 
that is, since almost all African countries depend on rain -fed agriculture, they 
presume that drought will decrease employment opportunities for rural laborers. 
However, the approaches taken to measuring drought face three drawbacks.  
    First, these studies frequently neglect the time scale of drought indicators. 
For example, agricultural drought
4
, which is dependent on soil moisture has a 
relatively short time scale; Mckee, Doesken, and Kleist (1993: 2) suggested 
                                                        
4
 Agricultural drought occurs when there is not enough soil moisture to support average crop 
production (Carrão et.  al 2016) .   
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that a time scale of three months is “typical … for precipitation deficits to 
affect” soil moisture. In contrast, both Theisen, Holtermann, and Buhaug (2012)  
and Von Uexkull (2014) used a measurement method known as SPI6, which is 
more relevant to hydrologic droughts
5
 (Mckee, Doesken, and Kleist, 1993) . 
    Second, these approaches often neglect the seasonality of rainfall. In most 
cases, the time unit applied in previous studies is the year, with annual 
variations used to identify the presence and effects of drought. However, what 
really matters for agriculture is the seasonal rainfall, especially during the 
rainy season (Recha et al., 2016). Statistics on average rainfall over a full year 
may mask a precipitation shortage during the rainy season.  
    Additionally, most studies use the onset of civil conflict as their ou tcome 
variable, whereas drought does not necessarily lead to the conflict against the 
government. Rather, when confronted by droughts or other resource shortages, 
individuals and groups are more likely to compete against each other for scarce 
resources, not to rebel against the government (Hendrix and Salehyan, 2012; 
Theisen, 2012).  
    Furthermore, not all households, groups or communities are equally affected 
by drought. For instance, households with piped water or irrigation systems 
may be less influenced by rainfall anomalies than those who depend on streams 
or rivers as their main water source. The effect of drought on conflict may be 
conditional on the locally social-economic conditions, such as the dependence 
on rain-fed agriculture or access to water source  during drought seasons.  In 
addition, drought may also accentuate social divides, since marginalized groups 
may be less likely to get government support (Theisen, Holtermann, and 
Buhaug 2012). Thus, the effect of drought may be conditional on the level of 
social divisions as well.   
                                                        
5
 Hydrological drought occurs when there is below-normal water availability in groundwater  
or streamflow (Van Loon and Laaha 2015) .  
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3.3 Conceptual Framework and Hypotheses 
3.3.1 Conceptual Framework 
    Based on the findings and weaknesses of  previous literature, this chapter  is 
founded on the conceptual framework expla ined below and shown in Figure 6. 
 
Figure 6 Conceptual Framework for Chapter  3 
 
Source: This figure is created by the author.  
 
    In an effort to clarify the drought–conflict nexus as well as to investigate 
more precisely the potential mechanisms generating conflict in Kenya, this 
chapter poses two research questions. The first one concerns the aggregate  
effect of drought examining how on average drought affects intrastate conflict. 
The second question explores the conditional effects of drought by considering 
whether greed and grievance enhance the drought–conflict nexus.  
  
3.3.2 Hypotheses 
3.3.2.1 the Aggregate Effect of Drought on Conflict 
    Figure 5 shows that the non-state conflict is concentrated in Kenya’s arid and 
humid areas, while one-sided violence happened predominantly in humid areas . 
In arid lands inhabited predominantly by pastoralists, drought results in scarce 
pasture land and water shortages, forcing people to travel long distances in 
search of grass and water for their livestock.  
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    Prior qualitative studies show that drought may increase conflict over scarce 
resources but may also decrease conflict over cat tle raiding. Thus, it is difficult 
to predict the aggregate effect of drought on conflict.  
    However, considering that the pastoralists are predominantly living in arid  
areas, and the effect of drought in a certain district may be influenced by 
drought conditions in the neighboring district , I propose the following 
hypothesis:  
 
Hypothesis 1: The incidence of non-state conflict increases in a given district in 
Kenya’s arid area when its neighboring districts are hit by drought.  
 
    The situation in the humid area is more complex than that in the arid lands  
since both non-state conflict and one-sided violence are concentrated in these 
districts. Kenya’s humid area relies predominantly on rain -fed agriculture; 
moreover, this region is inhabited by a large  number of landless people who 
work as wage or squatting laborers (Alila, Kinyanjui, and Wanjohi, 1993) .  
    There are probably two pathways by which drought may affect the conflict in 
humid areas. First, the conflict may happen because drought induces direct 
competition over water resources for irrigation or livest ock. But alternatively, 
the opportunity cost effect is likely to arise because drought reduces the job 
opportunities for landless laborers. In this case, which pathway is more relevant 
to one-sided violence or to the non-state conflict? Mueller (2008) claimed that 
under the Moi regime, the government hired landless or unemployed youth to 
attack citizens before or after elections. Landless people are more likely to be 
motivated during the drought period due to the lack of job opportunities. 
Therefore, it is reasonable to expect that one-sided violence is more likely to 
break out through the opportunity cost channel. Since the effect of drought on 
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one-sided violence depends on how many landless people inhabit a certain 
district, its aggregate effect across all districts is again difficult to predict.  
    As for the non-state conflict, there have been frequent news reports of 
conflict between farmers and pastoralists during times of drought, because 
cattle belonging to pastoralists graze on farmers’ land . 6  As a result, the non-
state conflict in humid areas may have a similar pattern to that in arid areas, 
and the aggregate effect of drought on the conflict in humid areas may be 
unclear.  
 
3.3.2.2 the Conditional Effect of Drought on Conflict  
    As reviewed in the previous section that, the effect of drought on confli ct 
may be conditional on local  social-economic conditions and social divisions. 
Then what factors are more relevant under the Kenyan context?    
    Water is, obviously, the resource most directly related to drought. People 
rely on surface water as the direct drinking water source or use it to feed their 
cattle or irrigate land or crops. Thus, the effect of drought on the conflict may 
be affected by how much the district relies on unimproved water sources, 
regardless of whether the region has an arid or humid climate. We can deduce 
the following hypothesis:  
 
Hypothesis 2: The effect of drought on the non-state conflict is greater in 
districts that rely more heavily on unimproved water sources.  
 
                                                        
6 For example, see “As Water Falls Short,  Conflict  between Herders and Farmers Sharpens,” 
Reuters ,  November 23, 2015, www.reuters.com/ar ticle/kenya -climatechange-conflict -
idUSL8N13D4G420151123  (accessed on August 2 , 2017).  
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    On the other hand, as suggested by Mueller (2008) and Kahl (2006),  landless 
people are more likely to be motivated during the drought period due to the 
lack of job opportunities . Thus, hypothesis 3 can be generated as follows:  
 
Hypothesis 3: The effect of drought on one -sided violence is greater in districts 
where more people are landless.  
 
    As indicated in previous literature that,  countries which are ethnically 
fractionalized were highly prone to conflict when hit by droughts (Couttenier 
and Soubeyran, 2014). This chapter also tests whether ethnic diversity 
enhances the intensity of various conflicts when drought occurs at the district 
level. Thus, another hypothesis can be derived: 
 
Hypothesis 4: The effect of drought on  conflict is greater in districts that  are 
more ethnically fractionalized.  
 
3.4 Methodology and Data  
3.4.1 Methodology  
    Following previous literature, this chapter  applies a reduced form of a model 
that estimates the aggregate effect of drought on the intrastate conflict through 
various mechanisms (Burke, Hsiang, and Miguel, 2015; Couttenier and 
Soubeyran, 2014):  
 
Conflictdt = a0 + a1Droughtdt +μ t +sd  +vdt                       (1a) 
 
Conflictdt = a0 + a1Droughtdt +μ t +sd*t +vdt                      (1b) 
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where Conflictdt is the incidence of various types of conflict in district d at 
year t; μ t and sd  denote the year fixed effect and district  fixed effect, 
respectively. Droughtdt here equals 1 if the drought indicator is one standard 
deviation below the mean in district d at year t. district-specific time fixed sd*t 
is controlled for as a robustness check in equation (1b). 
    As already noted, the effect of drought on conflict may be conditional on 
other factors. Considering that the level of social-economic factors and social 
divisions may be determined simultaneously with the level of conflict, namely 
the concern of simultaneous bias, Equation (2) tests whether the drought–
conflict nexus is conditional on initial measurements of these factors, denoted 
by X as follows:     
 
Conflictdt = b0+ b1Droughtdt +b2Xd
basel ine
*Droughtdt  
                                                   +μ t +sd +vdt                                (2) 
 
3.4.2 Data  
3.4.2.1 Intrastate Conflict  
    For the outcome variable, this chapter  derives data on conflict events from 
the Uppsala Conflict Data Program Georeferenced Event Dataset (UCDP GED), 
Version 5.0 (Sundberg and Melander, 2013), in which an event is defined as “an 
incident where armed force was used by an organized actor against another 
organized actor, or against civilians, resulting in at least one direct death at a 
specific location and a specific date”  (Croicu and Sundberg, 2017:2). The 
dataset recorded 681 events in three categories of conflict between 1989 and 
2015: 59 cases of state-based conflict, 440 non-state conflicts, and 182 
incidents of one-sided violence. I dropped 91 events from the dataset, either 
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because sufficient specificity of location was lacking or because governments of 
neighboring countries were involved.
7
 
    Some previous studies have used equally sized pixels , kept constant across 
time and space, as the basic unit of analysis. However, this method ignores 
administrative divisions and boundaries, which are important for the building of 
common identity as well as the organization of collective actions, such as 
engagement in the intergroup conflict. One concern with using district 
boundaries after independence, especially in the Kenyan case, is that the growth 
of numbers of districts in Kenya is influenced by elections, which can also 
precipitate violence. Therefore, this chapter uses the boundaries at 
independence, when the whole territory of Kenya was divided into 41 districts, 
to generate a panel dataset. As a result, the incidence of conflict within the 
panel dataset was defined as the number of conflict events occurring within a 
particular district during the period of 1 year.  
 
3.4.2.2 Drought  
    Studies of drought usually use the Palmer Drought Severity Index (PDSI) or 
the Standardized Precipitation Index (SPI) (Vicente-Serrano, Beguería, and 
López-Moreno, 2010). However, both of these two indices have unsolved 
shortcomings. The main weakness of the PDSI is that it uses a fixed timescale 
of between 9 and 12 months. Since drought is a multi -scalar phenomenon that 
depends on various factors relating to usab le water resources, such as soil 
moisture and groundwater (Mckee, Doesken, and Kleist, 1993) , “the time scale 
over which water deficits accumulate becomes extremely importan t” (Vicente-
                                                        
7
 Twenty events had no information on the specific locat ion where they occurred, and their  
descriptions contained simply the geographic coordinates associated with the country 
(latitude 1 degree south, longitude 38 degrees east); the location of 23 events could be 
identified only at the provincial level; and in  48 events,  one of the participants was the 
government of a neighboring country.  
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Serrano, Beguería, and López-Moreno, 2010: 1697). The main criticism of the 
SPI, on the other hand, is that its calculation is based only on precipitation.  
    Therefore, in line with Harari and La Ferrara (2013), this chapter applies a 
recently developed indicator, the Standardized Precipitation Evapotranspiration 
Index (SPEI), which considers the influence of factors such as precipitation, 
temperature, wind speed, and the soil’s water holding capacity (Vicente-
Serrano, Beguería, and López-Moreno, 2010). Similar to the SPI, the SPEI 
provides multiple time scales ranging from 1 to 48 months (hereafter SPEI1 to 
SPEI48). The calculation of the SPEI is based on monthly data and expressed 
in units of standard deviation from the long-term mean.  
    Agricultural droughts are closely related to soil moisture, which can be best 
captured by a short time scale such as 3  months (McKee, Doesken, and Kleist, 
1993). In addition, droughts in Kenya are linked to insufficient rainfall during 
the March–May (long rainy) season (Tierney, Ummenhofer, and deMenocal, 
2015). I use average SPEI3 during the long rainy season to define drought 
conditions. The drought variable is expressed in the binary form as equal to 1 
if the average of the SPEI3 from March to May was at least one standard 
deviation below the mean. Since the framework explained above concerns the 
impact of drought on conflict not only through agriculture but also due to 
direct water shortages, a longer timescale of 6 months, namely the SPEI6 
averaged over the long rainy season, was also used to define drought.  
    One concern about using SPEI to define drought is that it may be 
endogenous since variables used for calculating SPEI is not randomly 
distributed, such as the water holding capacity of the soil. The soil’s water 
holding capacity may be correlated with economic or political factors, which 
affect conflict as well. Therefore, cross -sectional studies, which exploit 
variation in drought conditions in different locations to explain conflict face  
endogeneity problems. While it is not a problem under a panel data setting like  
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what will be used in this chapter since fixed effects estimators rely on 
variations across time to identify the variation in conflict, and the variations 
across time largely depends on randomly distributed variables such as rainfall 
and temperature.  
 
3.4.2.3 Ethnic Diversity  
    The most prevalent method of measuring ethnic diversity is the index of 
ethno-linguistic fractionalization (ELF), first used by Easterly and Levine 
(1997) based on the Atlas Narodov Mira to  explain the growth tragedy of 
African countries. This can be expressed by the following equation:  
 
         
 
 
          
 
                            
 
where s i  denotes the share of group i in the total population, and it reflects the 
likelihood of randomly choosing two people who come from different ethnic 
groups.  Even though measuring ethnic diversity using the ELF is 
straightforward, this tool does not necessarily capture the extent of ethnic 
divisions within a certain country. For example, according to the calculation of 
the ELF index by Taylor and Hudson (1972) , Tanzania was the most 
fractionalized country,  with 93 per cent to Kenya’s 83 per cent. However, 
Kenya is much more ethnically divided than Tanzania, based on  media reports 
on ethnic conflicts.  
    One persistently debated issue related to the measurement of ethnic diversity 
is “whether it is ethnic diversity per se or a particular pattern of diversity that 
is important” (Bleaney and Dimico, 2017: 358) , especially when explaining its 
effect on conflict. For example, Horowitz (1985) contended that conflict is less 
likely to happen in either highly homogeneous or highly heterogeneous 
countries. Accordingly, Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005) used an 
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alternative index to measure ethnic diversity, based on the earlier theoretical 
work of Esteban and Ray (1994). They proposed an index of ethnic polarization,  
which is calculated by the following equation:  
 
       
      
   
    
 
     
       
 
                              
 
where s i denotes the share of group i  in the total population, as in equation (3). 
This index captures to what extent the distribution of the groups is approximate 
to a bimodal one (Reynal-Querol, 2002). 
    The ELF also failed to capture the political dynamics associated with 
conflict because not all ethnic groups are relevant in a given situation as 
organized political actors competing over resources (Posner, 2004; Wimmer, 
Cederman, and Min, 2009). For this reason, Wimmer, Cederman, and Min 
(2009) proposed using the Ethnic Power Relation (EPR) dataset instead. They 
provided evidence that the probability of conflict increases where more ethnic 
groups are competing for national power.  
    In almost every previous study, the measurement of ethnic diversity was at 
the country level. But this approach overlooks the spatial distribution of ethnic 
groups within the country, a factor that may be more relevant to c ollective 
actions such as conflict. It  may also provide misleading implications if a 
country is highly fractionalized overall but highly polarized at the local level; 
in such a case, perhaps the polarization, not the fractionalization, is the 
immediate driver of local conflict (Buhaug and Lujala, 2005; Cederman and 
Gleditsch, 2009). 
    Therefore, ethnic diversity was measured in this chapter using the following 
methods. The first one is the ethnic fractionalization index (EF) at the district 
level based on equation (3). I use detailed census data from 1989 based on a 
uniform standard to measure ethnic groups, so as to ensure comparability and 
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also incorporate the spatial distribution of ethnic groups. One problem of 
measuring ethnic diversity at a disaggregated level is that it may be 
endogeneous since ethnic composition is always changing because of migration, 
which may itself be influenced by the conflict. Since the intrastate conflict was 
virtually nonexistent before the early 1990s in Kenya (Kimenyi and Ndung’u, 
2005), using the population census from the initial year can prevent feedback 
effects from conflicts to ethnic diversity. Therefore, the effect of drought on 
conflict conditional on ethnic diversity can be interpreted as a causal one. 
Second, an ethnic polarization index (EP) at the district level  was calculated 
based on equation (4), again using the 1989 census. 
 
Figure 7 Ethnic Fractionalization and Ethnic Polarization by District,  1989  
 
Note: I calculated them based on 1989 Population Census.  
 
    Additionally, to capture the political dynamics associated with the conflict, I 
refer to the Ethnic Power Relations Core dataset (EPR Core) (Vogt et al., 2015). 
I adjust the population denominator according to the weight of each politically 
relevant group in each district, following Posner (2004), when calculating 
politically ethnic fractionalization and polarization indices. Figure 7 shows the 
relation between these two indices of ethnic fractionalization and polarization.  
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3.4.2.4 Other Variables     
    The share of landless households and of households using unimproved water 
sources during the wet season by district was calculated using data from the 
Welfare Monitoring Survey (WMS) 1992. Unimproved water sources include 
rivers, lakes, ponds, dams, unprotected springs, unprotected wells, and others as 
classified in the 1992 WMS. Descriptive statistics at the district level are 
reported in Table 5. 
 
Table 5 Summary Statistics of Chapter 3 
Variable          Observation Mean Std. Dev.  Minimum Maximum 
All Conflict  1,107 0.533 2.128 0 24 
State-Based Confl ict  1,107 0.015 0.322 0 9 
Non-State Conflict  1,107 0.369 1.665 0 24 
One-Sided Violence  1,107 0.149 1.129 0 22 
Ethnic Fractionalization  1,107 0.395 0.265 0.034 0.865 
Ethnic Polarization  1,107 0.473 0.232 0.067 0.840 
Political Ethnic Fractionalization  1,107 0.304 0.215 0.034 0.799 
Political Ethnic Polarizat ion  1,107 0.451 0.250 0.067 0.857 
Temperature 1,107 22.106 3.864 13.229 28.936 
Temperature Deviation  1,107 0.015 0.996 −2.391 2.052 
Precipitation 1,025 81.853 35.112 10.661 176.974 
Precipitation Deviat ion  1,025 −0.028 0.985 −3.120 4.139 
SPEI3 Long Rainy 1,066 0.002 0.690 −1.998  2.046 
SPEI3 Drought,  Long Rainy  1,107 0.061 0.239 0 1 
SPEI6 Long Rainy 1,066 0.126 0.801 −1.70 2.53 
SPEI6 Drought,  Long Rainy  1,107 0.071 0.258 0 1 
SPEI3 Drought,  Neighbor  1,107 0.049 0.216 0 1 
Share of Unimproved Water 918 0.523 0.229 0.012 0.953 
Share of Landless People  918 0.193 0.228 0.008 0.967 
 
3.5 Empirical Results 
3.5.1 the Aggregate Effect  
    I first report the aggregate effect of drought on the incidence of different 
types of conflicts using equation (1a), with standard errors clustered at the 
district level. Estimated results are shown in Table 6. Columns (1), (3), and (5) 
control for both year and district fixed effects; columns (2), ( 4), and (6) show 
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estimated results of equation (1b), which additionally control for district linear 
time trends. The results show that in all the specifications, SPEI3 drought 
during the rainy season had a significantly negative relation with the non -state 
conflict, which is consistent with Theisen's (2012) findings for Kenya. With 
regard to one-sided violence, the relation is positive but not statistically 
significant at conventional levels.  
 
Table 6 Aggregate Effect  of Drought on the Intrastate Conflict,  1989 –2015 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Outcome Variable  All Conflict  Non-State Conflict  One-Sided Violence  
              
SPEI3 Drought,  Long Rainy  −0.455 −0.160 −0.673** −0.376* 0.223 0.193 
 
(0.356) (0.277) (0.250) (0.188) (0.211) (0.177) 
       Year Fixed Effect  Y Y Y Y Y Y 
District Fixed Effect  Y Y Y Y Y Y 
District Linear Time Trend  N Y N Y N Y 
       Observations  1,107 1,107 1,107 1,107 1,107 1,107 
R-squared 0.081 0.257 0.057 0.302 0.073 0.128 
Number of Districts  41 41 41 41 41 41 
Note: Robust  standard errors clustered at the district level are shown in parentheses. *,  **,  
and *** denote significance at the 10 per cent level,  5 per cent level,  and 1 per cent level,  
respectively.  
 
     As has been shown in Figure 5, the distribution of conflict is spatially 
heterogeneous, and the non-state conflict is usually concentrated in arid and 
humid areas. Therefore, Table 7 categorizes the 41 districts into three groups 
according to their agro-ecological features. It also investigates whether the 
incidence of conflict is affected by drought conditions in neighboring districts. 
The presence of drought in neighboring districts  is defined by a binary variable , 
which equals 1 if the value of average SPEI3 is one deviation below the mean.  
    The estimated results indicate  that drought conditions in neighboring 
districts had a significantly negative effect on the conflict in general  as shown 
40 
in column (5). However, the estimated coefficients demonstrate positive signs  
in humid and arid areas, which are not statistically significant . One concern of 
small number of clusters is  that the cluster-robust standard errors may be 
downwardly biased (Cameron, Gelbach, & Miller, 2008) , therefore a wild 
cluster bootstrap method has been used to calculate standard errors to avoid 
over-rejection, and the estimated results are demonstrated in Appendix  1, 
which are consistent with Table 7. It is worth noting that the es timated 
coefficient of drought in neighboring districts  is statistically significant at 12 
percent significance level (column (8) of Appendix 1). The drought in 
neighboring districts  was expected to increase the intensity of non-state 
conflict to about 0.479  events. Considering that the average incidence of non -
state conflict was 0.369 events, this effect of drought in neighboring districts is 
a substantial one, equivalent to an increase of around 30% in the incidence of 
conflict. 
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Table 7 Aggregate Effect  of Drought on the Non -State Conflict,  1989–2015 
  (1)  (2) (3) (4)       (5) (6)  (7) (8) 
Outcome Variable  Non-State Conflict  
  Full sample  Humid Semi-Arid  Arid  Full sample  Humid Semi-Arid  Arid  
SPEI3 Drought,  Long Rainy  -0.673** -0.483 0.008 -0.575 -0.521** -0.623 0.029 -0.796 
 
(0.250) (0.285) (0.112) (0.639) (0.249) (0.414)  (0.104) (0.675) 
SPEI3 Drought,  Long Rainy  
    
-0.322* 0.312 -0.060 0.479 
in Neighboring District  
    
(0.173) (0.389)  (0.101) (0.381) 
         
Year Fixed Effect  Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
District Fixed Effect  Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
         
R-squared 0.302 0.197 0.113 0.393 0.302 0.198 0.113 0.394 
Number of Districts  41 19 13 9 41 19 13 9 
Note: Robust standard errors clustered at the distr ict level are shown in parentheses. *,  **,  and *** denote significance at the 10 per cent level,  
5 per cent level,  and 1 per cent level,  respectively.  
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3.5.2 the Conditional Effect  
    The evidence thus far suggests that the aggregate effect of drought on 
conflict depends on the conflict types. I now test whether the drought –conflict 
nexus is conditional on the baseline measurement of social -economics factors 
or social divisions.  
 
Table 8  Conditional  Effect of Drought on Conflict ,  Social-Economic Conditions  
  (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) 
Outcome Variable  Non-State Conflict  One-Sided Violence  
 Full Sample  Humid ASA Full Sample  Humid ASA 
SPEI6 Drought,  Long Rainy  -0.458** -0.361 -0.459 
   
 
(0.185) (0.286) (0.329) 
   Share of Unimproved Water 
Sources* 0.938** 0.299 1.375* 
   SPEI6 Drought Rainy Season  (0.418) (0.546) (0.735) 
   SPEI3 Drought Long Rainy 
   
-0.219** -0.102 0.020 
    
(0.105)  (0.744) (0.019) 
Share of Landless People*  
   
2.324*** 2.626*** -0.047 
SPEI3 Drought Long Rainy 
   
(0.564)  -0.102 (0.078) 
       Year Fixed Effect  Y Y Y Y Y Y 
District Fixed Effect  Y Y Y Y Y Y 
District Linear Time Trend  N N N N N N 
       
Observations  918 513 405 918 513 405 
R-squared 0.119 0.192 0.150 0.152 0.214 0.141 
Number of Districts  34 19 15 34 19 15 
Note: Robust  standard errors clustered at the district level are shown in parentheses. *,  **,  
and *** denote significance at the 10 per cent level,  5 per cent level,  and 1 per cent level,  
respectively.  
 
    Table 8 tests hypotheses 2 and 3 using equation (2) to determine whether the 
effect of drought on the non-state conflict or one-sided violence is conditional 
on the social-economic factors as defined above. Due to data limitations in arid 
districts, this chapter  classifies all 41 districts into two categories: the humid 
and the arid and semi-arid areas (ASA). Given that agriculture droughts and 
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hydrological droughts differ with regard to their timescales, SPEI3 and SPEI6, 
respectively, during the long rainy season were used to define drought.  
    The estimated results contained in column (1) of Table 8 show that on 
average, districts are expected to have 0.45 more conflict episodes when hit by 
drought. Districts where the share of households with unimproved water 
sources increases 10 per cent during the rainy season, are expected to have 0.1 
more conflict episodes, which provide supportive evidence for hypothesis 2. 
When we distinguish the district by their agro -ecological features, as displayed 
in columns (2) and (3), the estimated coefficients are only statistically 
significant in ASA areas.  
    For one-sided violence, columns (4) and (5) show that the share  of landless 
households significantly influences the effect of d rought on the conflict. A 1  
percent increase in landless household is expected to increase the incidence of 
one-sided violence during periods of drought by 0.02 events in humid areas. 
This is equivalent to an increase of more than 13 per cent , providing supportive 
evidence for hypothesis 3.  These results are robust when the wild cluster 
bootstrap is used to calculate standard errors as shown in Appendix 2.  
    Table 9 displays the estimated results with regard to the effect of drought on 
conflict conditional on various measures of social divisions . Columns (2) and 
(4) of Table 9 show that both political ethnic fractionalization and political  
ethnic polarization affects the intensity of  non-state conflict in general . This 
finding verifies the argument that not all ethnic groups are relevant actors 
competing over resources (Posner, 2004; Wimmer, Cederman, and Min, 2009) . 
    In contrast, ethnic fractionalization  and political ethnic fractionalization  
have a large influence on the relationship between drought and one-sided 
violence, as shown in columns (5) and (6) of Table 9. That is possibly because 
one-sided violence has always coincided with election years . And violence 
44 
around elections aimed to expulse other ethnic communities  from land occupied 
by the pastoral groups during the pre-colonial period (Kahl 2006).  
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Table 9  Conditional  Effect of Drought on Conflict , Social Divisions 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Outcome Variables Non-State Conflict  One-Sided Violence 
SPEI3 Drought Long Rainy -0.716* -1.088** -0.893 -1.444*** -0.199 -0.306*** 0.210 -0.046 
 
(0.396) (0.414) (0.542) (0.499) (0.124) (0.113) (0.220) (0.123) 
EF*SPEI3 Drought Long Rainy 0.090 
   
0.894* 
   
 
(0.770) 
   
(0.493) 
   Political EF*SPEI3 Drought Long Rainy 
 
1.317* 
   
1.682** 
  
  
(0.773) 
   
(0.722) 
  EP*SPEI3 Drought Long Rainy 
  
0.447 
   
0.027 
 
   
(1.149) 
   
(0.274) 
 Political EP*SPEI3 Drought Long Rainy 
   
1.736** 
   
0.606 
    
(0.852) 
   
(0.362) 
Constant 0.049 0.049 0.049 0.049 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 
(0.108) (0.109) (0.108) (0.110) (0.058) (0.058) (0.059) (0.059) 
         Year Fixed Effect  Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
District Fixed Effect  Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
District Linear Time Trend N N N N N N N N 
         
Observations 1,107 1,107 1,107 1,107 1,107 1,107 1,107 1,107 
R-squared 0.057 0.060 0.058 0.062 0.076 0.080 0.073 0.074 
Number of District 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 
Note: Robust standard errors clustered at the district level are shown in parentheses. *, **,  and *** denote significance at the 10 per cent level, 
5 per cent level, and 1 per cent level, respectively.  
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3.6 Conclusions  
    This chapter conducts a subnational analysis of the effects of drought on 
various kinds of conflict in Kenya from 1989 to 2015. It exploits the variations 
in drought conditions across time within a spatial unit to identify the causal 
effect of drought on intrastate conflict. It takes into account the timing of 
droughts, which cause severe impacts during the  long rainy season, and 
explores not only the aggregate but also the conditional effects of drought, so 
as to provide important insights into the potential mechanisms through which a 
drought–conflict nexus may operate.  
    The results confirm that in general, drought has no impac t on the intrastate 
conflict. This finding is in alignment with previous studies that used other 
measurements of drought  (Theisen, Holtermann, and Buhaug, 2012; Von 
Uexkull, 2014). However, the effect of drought on the conflict varies 
depending on the type of conflict. Overall, the analysis fo und that drought 
actually has a cooling effect on the non-state conflict in Kenya. This result is 
consistent with previous qualitative and quantitative studies of Kenya (Theisen, 
2012; Witsenburg and Adano, 2009). In addition, the analysis reveals  a spatial 
inconsistency between the drought and the conflict, which provide insight into 
the potential consequences of environmentally related migration.  
    Although the aggregate effect of drought on the conflict is not robust in 
general, the findings of this chapter imply that the nexus is conditional, with 
its strength substantially affected by access to unimproved water source, the 
ownership of lands and the level of social divisions.  
    Then how to interpret these results from the perspective of inequality? 
Because of the concern of endogeneity, this chapter uses  baseline data about 
social economic conditions such as the share of households with unimproved 
water source by district. How can we relate the baseline situation  to the current 
situation and provide policy implications afterward? 
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    Figure 8 (a) plots the share of households with improved water source by 
county (district)
8
 in 2014 against that in 1992. It is obvious that the relative 
share of households with improved water source does not vary that much over 
time, which discloses that the situation of the district where a higher share of 
households lacks basic opportunities in terms of improved water source has 
been slightly improved in the past two decades. In other words, between-region 
(county) inequality is barely improved since county (district) where the share 
of households with unimproved water is higher in 1992 is high er as well in 
2014 (see Figure 8(a)).  Between-region inequality may enhance the drought-
conflict nexus since non-state conflict increases in a certain district when its 
neighboring districts were hit by drought especially in the arid area.   
  
Figure 8  Households with Improved Water Source by County  
  
Note: I created this figure based on DHS 2014 and WMS 1992.  
 
    Figure 8(b) shows a downward sloping relationship between inequality in 
the share of households with the improved water sources and its sample mean, 
which imply that counties, where a higher share of households uses improved 
water sources have the lower inequality. The estimated results in Table 8 shows 
                                                        
8
 The 2010 constitutional amendment changed the administrative units into counties,  instead 
of the provinces and dist ricts that had been used before . The geographic areas of counties 
are almost identical to district used before.  
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that conflict is more likely to breakout in district s with a lower share of 
improved water source during drought season, which implies that in these 
districts, unequal access to improved water within a certain region also matters 
for intrastate conflict.  
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Chapter 4 Ethnic Favoritism in Education
9
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
    The analysis in Chapter 3 implies that between-region inequality has barely 
improved in Kenya in the past two decades. One striking feature of regions in 
Kenya is that every region has one dominant ethnic group.
10
 That is because 
the consciousness of ethnicity in Kenya was originally a geographic one that 
was first created by the British colonial administration,  which divided Kenyan 
territory into districts according to what was assumed to be different ethnic 
groups.  
    After independence, the post-colonial government further reinforced 
geographic divides by aligning parliamentary constituencies with former ethnic 
boundaries (Alwy and Schech 2004). Therefore, from the provincial to the 
district level, Kenyan regions have been seen as ethnically homogenous within 
each district but heterogeneous across districts, as shown in Table 1 0. There 
are more than 40 ethnic groups in Kenya. According to the 1962 population 
census, the six largest ethnic groups were Kikuyu (19 per cent), Luo (13 per 
cent), Luhya (13 per cent), Kamba (11 per cen t) and Kalenjin (11 per cent), 
jointly comprising more than half the whole population, and the national 
proportions of these ethnic groups have kept stable since independence in 1963 
(Burgess, Miguel, Jedwab, & Morjaria, 2015). According to Oucho (2002), the 
post-independence governments allocated resources in a way that allowed the 
president to favor their home regions or their own ethnic groups. Therefore, 
between-region inequality displayed earlier may be just demonstration of 
                                                        
9
 Acknowledgement:  This chapter is derived in par t from my article published in Education 
Economics on November 02,2017 , available online: 
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/1 0.1080/09645292.2017.1398310 . 
10
 Dominant ethnic group here demotes the largest ethic group in terms of population share 
within a certain region such as district and province.   
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between-ethnicity inequality or vice versa. In other words, it is not clear 
whether the better developmental outcomes in certain regions are  because the 
president only favors his own ethnic groups or favors certain regions as a 
whole. 
 
Table 10 Districts and Dominant Ethnic Groups over Time  
Table 10 Districts and Dominant Ethnic Groups over Time  
Province  District  1969 census  1979 census  1989 census 
Ethnicity Share  Ethnicity Share  Ethnicity Share  
Central  Kiambu Kikuyu 94.5 Kikuyu 90.6 Kikuyu 88.0 
Central  Kirinyaga  Kikuyu 96.4 Kikuyu 96.9 Kikuyu 97.0 
Central  Muranga Kikuyu 96.2 Kikuyu 95.5 Kikuyu 95.9 
Central  Nyandarua  Kikuyu 94.7 Kikuyu 95.1 Kikuyu 95.7 
Central  Nyeri  Kikuyu 97.8 Kikuyu 96.8 Kikuyu 96.6 
Coast  Kilifi  Mijikenda 91.8 Mijikenda 88.4 Mijikenda 90.3 
Coast  Kwale  Mijikenda 83.0 Mijikenda 82.0 Mijikenda 82.6 
Coast  Lamu Bajun 65.7 Bajun 45.8 Bajun 40.4 
Coast  Mombasa Mijikenda 23.9 Mijikenda 25.8 Mijikenda 27.9 
Coast  Taita Taveta Taita 78.5 Taita 75.8 Taita 71.5 
Coast  Tana River Pokomo 57.4 Pokomo 35.2 Pokomo 37.0 
Eastern Embu Embu 61.0 Embu 62.5 Embu 60.5 
Eastern Isiolo Boran 52.7 Boran 49.2 Boran 34.2 
Eastern Kitui  Kamba 97.3 Kamba 97.0 Kamba 97.0 
Eastern Machakos Kamba 97.7 Kamba 96.7 Kamba 97.0 
Eastern Marsabit  Rendille  34.3 Boran 31.6 Boran 28.2 
Eastern Meru Meru 90.0 Meru 96.5 Meru 89.0 
Nairobi Nairobi Kikuyu 37.6 Kikuyu 33.4 Kikuyu 32.4 
Nyanza Kisii  Kisii  98.0 Kisii  98.0 Kisii  98.2 
Nyanza Kisumu Luo 90.7 Luo 89.9 Luo 89.2 
Nyanza Siaya Luo 96.4 Luo 96.7 Luo 95.8 
Nyanza South Nyanza Luo 88.7 Luo 79.1 Luo 76.5 
Rift  Valley Baringo Kalenjin  85.0 Kalenjin  84.8 Kalenjin  83.8 
Rift  Valley Elgeyo Marakwet  Kalenjin  96.5 Kalenjin  93.4 Kalenjin  91.3 
Rift  Valley Kajiado Masai  68.6 Masai  62.8 Masai  56.6 
Rift  Valley Kericho Kalenjin  81.4 Kalenjin  82.7 Kalenjin  82.7 
Rift  Valley Laikipia  Kikuyu 57.5 Kikuyu 64.4 Kikuyu 67.8 
Rift  Valley Nakuru Kikuyu 58.2 Kikuyu 60.8 Kikuyu 59.7 
Rift  Valley Nandi  Kalenjin  78.1 Kalenjin  70.7 Kalenjin  73.6 
Rift  Valley Narok Masai  66.5 Masai  56.2 Masai  47.3 
Rift  Valley Samburu Samburu 74.1 Samburu 75.0 Samburu 74.7 
Rift  Valley Trans Nzoia Luhya 47.1 Luhya 49.3 Luhya 52.0 
Rift  Valley Turkana Turkana 98.9 Turkana 96.2 Turkana 94.5 
Rift  Valley Uasin Gishu Kalenjin  53.2 Kalenjin  55.0 Kalenjin  52.6 
Rift  Valley West Pokot Kalenjin  93.4 Kalenjin  88.8 Kalenjin  85.2 
Western Bungoma Luhya 83.5 Luhya 81.4 Luhya 82.8 
Western Busia  Luhya 65.1 Luhya 59.5 Luhya 61.4 
Western Kakamega Luhya 95.6 Luhya 94.6 Luhya 94.5 
North Eastern  Garissa  Somali  93.0 Somali  81.1  Somali  84.2 
North Eastern  Mandera Gurren 46.1 Gurren 52.6  Gurren 48.9 
North Eastern  Wajir  Degodia 43.8 Degodia 49.2  Degodia 51.7 
Note:  The term “Kalenjin”  was first  used as an ethnic category in the 1979 census.  In  the 1969 
census,  the Kalenjin populat ion share is  calculated as the summation of i ts  seven sub -tr ibes (Tugen,  
Nandi,  Kipsigis,  Elgeyo,  Marakwet,  Pokot,  and Sabaot)  for co nsistency with the later  census.  Kenya 
51 
has conducted five population census rounds since its independence. The first three  census 
rounds (1969, 1979, and 1989) used the same administrative framework, which included 41 
districts,  while the 1999 and 2009 censuses included 69 and 158 districts,  respectively,  due 
to decentralization. Neither of the last two census rounds provided any detailed information 
on the ethnic geography of any district.  
 
    Figure 9 shows the share of government account expenditure in selected 
major sectors since independence in Kenya, from which it is obvious that the 
education sector has been the single largest expenditure item over several 
decades, whereas expenditure on other sectors, such as health, roads, or water, 
has undergone little change and has demonstrated a decreasing trend, especially 
since the 1980s. This reveals that the education sector has been the ma jor 
priority for the Kenyan government since independence, and policy 
interventions are likely to have mainly occurred in the education sector during  
the post-independence period.  
 
Figure 9 Share of Government Account Expenditure by Sector,  1963 –2016 
 
Note: This figure is created by the author based on the Statistical Abstract  1967–2016.  
Expenditures on roads and water are not available since 2003.  
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    Therefore, this chapter focuses on the educational outcomes of individuals  
and explores whether inequality in education exists and whether it comes from 
inequality in opportunities due to ethnic favoritism, namely the coethnicity 
with the president.  
    During the colonial era, formal education in Kenya was introduced and 
provided by the missionaries. It was racially segregated
11
 by the colonial 
government, resulting in severe neglect and lack of educational resources and 
facilities (e.g. physical schools) for African children when compared with their 
European-, Asian-, and Arab-descent counterparts (Eshiwani 1990). However, 
this division was not only between those of different ethnic backgrounds, as 
‘even among Africans, ethnic difference was manipulated to keep the various 
communities apart under the principle of “divide and rule”’ ( Eshiwani 1990: 3). 
As a result, at the time of independence in 1963, significant disparities in 
primary education existed across different ethnic groups, as shown in Table 11, 
which are mainly attributable to the geographic location of their respective 
homelands.
12
  
    The first post-independence government, led by President Kenyatta, a 
Kikuyu, made multiple attempts to address the problems facing the education 
system. In addition to a free education policy, the well -known Ominde 
Commission, which was set up in 1964, “ recommended expansion of 
educational facilities for those districts and provinces that had been 
educationally disadvantaged in terms of numbers of schools and enrolments”  
(Alwy and Schech 2004: 270). The subsequent two governments, headed by 
President Moi, a Kalenjin, and President Kibaki, a Kikuyu, respectively, also  
                                                        
11
 Race here denotes Africans, Asians, Arabs, and Europeans.  
12
 President Moi initiated an educational reform that changed the duration of primary 
schooling from seven to eight years in January 1985.   
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pledged to provide free primary education to realize the goal of universal 
primary education for their citizens.  
    However, their efforts were not equally directed toward the various ethnic 
groups. As mentioned earlier, the presidents in post-independence Kenya 
allocated resources in a way that favored their home regions or their own 
ethnic groups (Oucho 2002). Previous studies have corroborated this assertion 
by showing how ethnic favoritism has been prevalent in education (Franck and 
Rainer 2012; Kramon and Posner 2016)  and in road construction (Burgess et al.,  
2015). This phenomenon has also been reflected in public opinion polls 
(Mwabu et. al 2013) as well as in voting behavior (Bratton and Kimenyi 2008). 
Therefore, even though the consciousness of ethnicity was constructed by the 
colonial government, the nature of the disparities between ethnic groups has 
changed from being one of geographical dist inctiveness to one of being 
materially advantaged or disadvantaged through belonging to certain ethnic 
groups.  
    It is worth noting, from the trend shown in Table 11, that one of the 
politically dominant groups, the Kikuyu, has consistently outperform ed other 
ethnic groups in terms of completed primary schooling years. The Kikuyu had 
already confirmed their position as well advantaged in primary education prior 
to independence, and this situation has continued. This can be partly attributed 
to an early exposure to education, as white settlers during the colonial era were 
predominantly located in the Kikuyu home territory of Central Province . This 
enabled the Kikuyu to profit the most from the disproportionate allocation of 
educational resources by the white settlers (Alwy and Schech 2004). In 
addition, the educational success of the Kikuyu at the primary school level can 
be further ascribed to the group’s Independent School Movement, which 
reflected their early recognition of education’s importance (Stanfield 2005). By 
way of contrast, even though the Kalenjin people were extremely disadvantaged 
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in terms of education at the time of independence among the five largest ethnic 
groups, they achieved the fastest improvement in primary education especially 
during the 1970s and 1980s, which corresponds to when President Moi, a 
Kalenjin, was in power. In the past several decades, primary education has 
increased in tandem with decreased inequality measurements, notwithstanding 
that within-group variation explains most of the variation, its contribution 
share decreased from 95.8 per cent during the colonial e ra to 88.7 per cent in 
the 2000s. Correspondingly, an increasing share of the variation in inequality 
can be explained by the disparity among ethnic groups.   
 
Table 11 Primary Education Attainment and Inequality Measures over Time  
 
Colonial  1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s 
Years of Primary Schooling  
Kikuyu 4.856  5.777  6.491  7.273  7.488  7.749  
Kalenjin 3.335  3.886  5.361  6.703  6.893  7.154  
Luo 3.621  4.283  5.611  6.955  7.147  7.393 
Kamba 3.820  5.022  5.945  7.005  7.117  7.362 
Luhya 4.295  4.616  5.689  6.791  6.847  7.136 
Other  3.189  3.606  4.289  5.069  4.990  5.785  
Generalized Entropy Index GE (2)  
  0.312  0.228  0.114  0.083  0.087  0.053  
Inequality Decomposition  
Within 0.299  0.212  0.102  0.072  0.074  0.047  
Between 0.014  0.016  0.012  0.011  0.013  0.007  
Generalized Entropy Index GE (2) by Subgroups  
Kikuyu 0.172  0.078  0.023  0.017  0.015  0.005  
Kalenjin 0.383  0.293  0.102  0.043  0.041  0.021  
Luo 0.351  0.245  0.078  0.027  0.022  0.011  
Kamba 0.285  0.139  0.057  0.030  0.027  0.014  
Luhya 0.213  0.194  0.078  0.036  0.036  0.018  
Other  0.466  0.387  0.268  0.217  0.239  0.131  
Note: Author’s calculation is based on KDHS 1993 -2014. Despite the fact  that Kenya gained 
independence in 1963, the colonial period in this table was unti l 1959 since the main 
variable of interest coethnic  is defined as children who spent most of their pri mary school 
years under a coethnic president.   
 
    Thus, the question becomes whether the consistent dominance of the Kikuyu 
and the rapid improvement of the Kalenjin, as well as the increasing 
contribution of between-group variation in education, can be attributed to 
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ethnic favoritism. If this were the case, what would explain the variation in 
inequality measurements coming from within ethnic group variations? This 
chapter addresses these questions using household data from the Kenya 
Demographic and Health Survey (KDHS) and official population censuses.  
    The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. I will first provide a 
literature review on ethnic favoritism within the African context. Then, I will 
detail the empirical methodology and data sources. Summaries will be provided 
after presenting empirical results.  
 
4.2 Literature Review  
     The concept of ethnic favoritism has been traditionally used to explain the 
poor economic performance of African countries, such that it is seen as a result 
of ethnic diversity (Easterly and Levine 1997; Montalvo and Reynal-Querol 
2005). One reason why ethnic diversity may hinder economic development is 
its correlation with the under-provision of public goods (Alesina, Baqir, and 
Easterly 1999; Alesina et al. 2003; La Porta et al. 1999). Although it is widely 
accepted that there is a negative relationship between ethnic diversity and 
public goods provision (Habyarimana et al. 2007), a recent study by Gisselquist 
(2013) found that ethnic heterogeneity does not necessarily lead to the 
inadequate provision of public goods, as the relati onship between ethnic 
diversity and public goods provision varies according to the public goods 
themselves.  
    One of the main assumptions underpinning the negative association between 
ethnic diversity and public goods provision is that societies that are polarized 
due to ethnic diversity are prone to rent -seeking by different ethnic groups and 
have difficulty agreeing on public goods  allocation (e.g. Easterly and Levine 
1997; Alesina, Baqir, and Easterly 1999). This assumption is implicitly based 
on another assumption, namely that different ethnic groups have different 
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policy preferences. Even though a field experiment by Habyarimana et al. 
(2007) found that there were no significant ethnic differences in terms of 
security, drainage maintenance, and garbage collection in Uganda, this result 
does not rule out potential ethnic differences regarding preferences toward 
other public goods in different contexts. A systematic analysis by  Lieberman 
and McClendon (2012) confirmed a preference-based explanation for ethnic 
favoritism, such that coethnics have the same preference for education.        
    Another line of studies on ethnic favoritism focuses on formal theories of 
ethnic politics (Franck and Rainer 2012) to explain why political coalitions are 
based on ethnicity. For example, in Fearon’s (1999) model, ethnicity is used as 
an exclusion criterion to minimize the size of the winning coalition and to 
maximize the political  ‘pork’ or advantages that the coalition might obtain. The 
reason why ethnicity can serve as an exclusion criterion is that it cannot be 
chosen by an individual, unlike an individual’s political affiliation (Fearon 
1999). More recently, Pador i Miquel (2007: 1270) noted that his model is 
consistent with a public fund allocation bias under which “the government 
biases the allocation of resources by restricting access to bureaucratic posts, to 
the military or even to education to members of selected ethnic groups”, such 
as the Kikuyu and the Kalenjin in Kenya.  
     Discussions about the potential costs in relation to economic welfare or 
political instability, as well as the motivations behind ethnic favoritism, are 
still ongoing. An increasing number of studies have begun to empirically 
investigate the prevalence and magnitude of ethnic favoritism. 
    To the best of the author’s knowledge, Brockerhoff and Hewett (2000) 
provided the first cross-country study concerning Africa. They found that large 
disparities exist in child mortality among ethnic groups, a finding they attribute 
to the political landscape in countries such as Kenya. More recently, a study by 
Franck and Rainer (2012) systematically measured the existence and magnitude 
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of ethnic favoritism in 18 African countries. Their results showed that there is 
a widespread effect of ethnic favoritism in both primary education and infant 
mortality. Similar results can also be found in Kramon and Posner (2016) and 
Burgess et al. (2015), who, respectively, investigated ethnic favoritism in 
primary education and in road construction in Kenya. In contrast, in Guinea, 
Kudamatsu (2009) found no evidence of the acting president having favored his 
own ethnic group in the health sector. One possible explanation for these mixed 
results can be found in Kramon and Posner's (2013) study, which shows that 
the manifestation of ethnic favoritism varies markedly depending on the sectors 
one happens to study.
13
  
    Most previous studies on ethnic favoritism have investigated its prevalence 
and magnitude without clearly defining it. Only Burgess et al. (2015: 1817) 
explicitly defined the concept of ethnic favoritism as “a situation where 
coethnics benefit from patronage and public policy decisions, and thus receive 
a disproportionate share of public resources when members of their co-ethnic 
group control the government.”  This definition, however, only covers the 
supply-side mechanism of ethnic favoritism from the perspective of public 
resources allocation.   
    Another common drawback of previous studies is that they fail to clarify at 
which of two levels ethnic favoritism operates; whether it operates : (1) at the 
ethnic group level, where only coethnics of the sitting president can benefit 
from ethnically favored policies (e.g. ethnic-specific cash transfers or biased 
allocation of public sector jobs); or (2) at the district level, where both 
coethnics of the sitting president and local minorities living in the districts 
where the dominant ethnic group shares e thnicity with the president benefit 
                                                        
1 3  
Kramon and  Posner  (2013)  invest iga ted  the mani fes ta t ion  of ethnic favori t i sm in rela t ion to four outcomes  
( in fan t  surviva l ,  p r imary school complet ion,  household  elec t ri f ica t ion ,  and  water  source)  in s ix Afr ican  
count r ies  (Benin ,  Ken ya,  Malawi ,  Mali ,  Senegal ,  and  Zambia) .  They found that  pat terns and  magni tudes  varied  
across  d i fferen t  sectors  and count r ies .   
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from it (e.g. building new schools or hiring more qualified teachers at the 
district level). Thus, this chapter considers the effect of ethnic favoritism from 
the supply-side as well as from the viewpoint of demand-side mechanisms and 
clarifies at which level it operates. A theoretical framework is demonstrated in 
Figure 10. 
 
Figure 10 Theoretical Framework on How Ethnic Favoritism Operates  
 
Note: This figure is created by the author.  
 
    If ethnic favoritism operates at the ethnic group level, then coethnics of the 
sitting president can enjoy benefits through both supply-side and demand-side 
channels regardless of whether they live in a coethnic district or not (see the 
right side of Figure 10). Thus, if this were the case, then we could expect that 
coethnics of the president, namely the Kikuyu and Kalenjin, would have 
comparatively smaller within-ethnic group variance in terms of educational 
attainment. On the other hand, if ethnic favoritism  operates at the district level, 
coethnics of the president living in a non-coethnic district may not receive 
these benefits, while local minorities in coethnic districts would benefit from 
the supply-side channel of ethnic favoritism (see the left side of Figure 10). In 
that latter scenario, for coethnics of the president, within -ethnic group variance 
may not be necessarily smaller.  Inequality decomposit ion results detailed in 
Table 11 show that coethnics of President Moi, the Kalenjin people, display the 
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largest disparity among the five biggest ethnic groups, which supports the 
hypothesis that ethnic favoritism operates at the district level. However, most 
of the decrease in overall inequality comes from a decrease in intra -ethnic 
group variance, especially for the Kalenjin, which provides evidence for the 
hypothesis that ethnic favoritism may operate at the ethnic group level. 
Therefore, it is an empirical question to explore at which of these two levels 
ethnic favoritism operates.  
    Another problem of previous studies is that  inequality in socio-economic 
outcomes, such as primary educational attainment, already existed when Kenya 
gained independence in 1963 because of the education policies during the 
colonial era. Therefore, it is essential to isolate t he initial conditions’ effect  
across different ethnic groups in educational attainment when measuring the 
magnitude of ethnic favoritism.  
 
4.3 Empirical Methodology 
     This chapter utilizes the following empirical model to investigat e the 
prevalence of ethnic favoritism in Kenyan primary education at the ethnic 
group level:
14
  
 
Y iept  = β0 + β1Yep0  + β2coethnic i et  + θe  + δ t  +λpe+ X iB + ε i ep t               (5) 
 
where Y i ep t  denotes the primary educational attainment (which is measured by 
years of primary schooling and a binary variable of primary education 
completion) of individual i from ethnic group e living in province p who 
reached primary school age in year  t. As mentioned, primary education in 
                                                        
1 4  Accord ing to the 1993  KDHS fina l  report ,  there are 43 ethnic  groups  in Ken ya.  This  study ut i l izes  the self -
reported  ethn ic i t y of  every respondent .  For  s implici ty,  ethnici ty in  this  study has been ca tegorized  in to six  
ca tegories—Kalenj in ,  Kamba,  Kikuyu,  Luo,  Luhya,  othe rs—based  on thei r  compara tive  populat ion share.  The  
1993 KDHS fina l  report  is  avai lab le at  ht tp : / /dhsprogram.com/what -we-do/survey/survey-d isp lay-56 .cfm,  
accessed  on  18  Apri l  2016 .  
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Kenya was extended to eight years in 1985; hence,  for those who started 
primary education before 1985, the maximum value of years of primary 
schooling is seven, after which it is eight. Yep0 expresses the average of primary 
educational attainment for each ethnic group e in province p, using individuals 
who obtained most of their primary education before independence as a 
measure of the initial condition. This approach can also capture the potential 
effects of parental education and income levels on educational attainment, 
which influences considerably the education level of subsequent generations, 
as indicated in previous studies (Lowrance et al., 2008). Table 12 compares the 
key characteristics of the selected individuals to calculate the initial condition 
by ethnicity. To compare the magnitude of the estimated coefficient of the 
main variable of interest  coethnic i et  to previous studies, this chapter  follows 
Kramon and Posner (2016) and defines this variable as a binary variable that 
equals one if an individual spent most (more than four years) of their primary 
education under a coethnic president.  
 
Table 12 Characteristics of Individuals by Ethnici ty, Initial Condition  
Ethnicity Birth Year  Female Dummy Years of Primary Schooling  Primary Completion  
Kikuyu 1948.589 0.555 4.856 0.466 
Kalenjin 1948.261 0.526 3.335 0.222 
Luo 1948.659 0.572 3.621 0.311 
Kamba 1948.312 0.576 3.820 0.264 
Luhya 1948.389 0.514 4.295 0.350 
Others  1948.704 0.524 3.189 0.277 
Note: Author’s calculation is based on the KDHS 1993 -2014. Individuals who spent most of 
their primary school years before independence are included for calculating the init ial  
condition and the sample means are shown in the table.  
 
    While θe denotes the ethnicity fixed effect to capture ethnically specific 
factors (e.g. culture) that may influence educational attainment, δ t is a dummy 
variable for each starting year of primary school  (cohort) in order to control for 
time-fixed effects. Additionally, λpe controls for province-ethnicity level fixed 
effects, especially supply-side factors such as the availability of primary 
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schools financed either by missionaries or local communities during the 
colonial era, and X i represents a vector of individual characteristics including 
dummies of religion, female, and childhood spent in rural areas.  
    This regression model is used to investigate ethnic favoritism operating at 
the ethnic group level and tests whether ethnicity alone could determine 
whether individuals benefited from ethnic favoritism. However, public 
education is usually provided by administrative units, which were districts 
before the 2010 Kenyan constitutional amendment. It is also more efficient to 
provide public goods in districts where the  president’s coethnics are 
concentrated.  
    Kenyan population censuses since independence have shown that every 
district has one dominant ethnic group. If ethnic favoritism operates at the 
district level, the local minority may also benefit from ethnic favoritism. To 
ascertain whether ethnic favoritism operates at the district level , I use the 
following empirical model:  
 
Y idt  = δ0 + δ1Yd0  + δ2coethnic_district id t  + μ t  +γd + X iΔ + υ id t                       (6) 
 
where Y idt  denotes the primary educational attainment of individual  i in district 
d who reached primary school age in year t. In addition, Yd0  is the average 
primary educational attainment for people who spent most of their primary 
education in district d before independence, as a measure of the initial 
condition. Table 13 compares the key characteristics of the selected individuals 
to calculate the initial condition at the district level.  
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Table 13 Characteristics of Individuals by District ,  Initial Condition  
District  Birth Year  Female  Years of Primary 
Schooling 
Primary 
Completion Nairobi 1945.920 0.476 5.045 0.625 
Kirinyaga  1945.530 0.504 3.559 0.362 
Kiambu 1945.423 0.495 4.366 0.468 
Nyandaura 1945.473 0.532 3.483 0.319 
Nyeri  1945.307 0.494 4.605 0.471 
Muranga 1945.267 0.506 3.997 0.385 
Mombasa  1945.707 0.449 3.791 0.456 
Kwale  1945.307 0.496 0.957 0.092 
Kilifi  1945.376 0.520 1.284 0.117 
Tana River  1945.647 0.482 1.247 0.103 
Lamu 1945.016 0.471 1.141 0.112 
Taita Taveta 1945.107 0.528 3.362 0.296 
Marsabit  1945.177 0.502 0.392 0.032 
Isiolo 1944.536 0.487 0.721 0.062 
Embu 1945.588 0.505 3.243 0.320 
Machakos 1945.442 0.516 3.508 0.317 
Kitui  1945.027 0.525 1.912 0.180 
Meru 1945.457 0.489 2.565 0.238 
Garissa  1945.692 0.483 0.214 0.021 
Wajir  1944.942 0.486 0.184 0.017 
Mandera 1945.185 0.466 0.322 0.032 
Siaya 1945.158 0.514 3.192 0.297 
Kisumu 1945.392 0.470 3.206 0.290 
Kisii  1945.501 0.497 3.174 0.315 
South Nyanza  1945.218 0.505 2.826 0.245 
West Pokot 1945.388 0.524 0.570 0.043 
Baringo 1945.548 0.516 1.840 0.158 
Nakuru 1945.471 0.498 3.514 0.348 
Kericho 1945.484 0.497 2.635 0.250 
Turkana 1945.459 0.519 0.217 0.016 
Samburu 1945.254 0.534 0.524 0.047 
Trans Nzoia 1945.649 0.481 3.040 0.271 
Nandi  1945.259 0.509 2.743 0.221 
Laikipia  1945.237 0.511 2.693 0.232 
Narok 1945.713 0.507 0.979 0.087 
Kajiado 1945.801 0.493 1.477 0.154 
Elgeyo Marakwet  1945.420 0.505 2.289 0.205 
Uasin Gishu 1945.566 0.480 2.892 0.263 
Busia  1944.934 0.506 2.664 0.246 
Kakamega 1945.292 0.497 3.483 0.315 
Bungoma 1945.363 0.500 3.625 0.357 
Note: Author’s calculation is based on the 1989 census. Individuals who spent most of their 
primary school years before independence are included for calculating the initial condition  
and the sample means are shown in the table.   
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    The main variable of interest, coethnic_district id t , equals one if individual  i 
spent most of their primary school  years at district  d, where the dominant 
group shared ethnicity with the president in year t.
15
 I change the threshold of 
the dominant ethnic groups’ population share when defining a coethnic_district,  
to verify whether the magnitude of ethnic favoritism differs.  The standard 
threshold for defining a coethnic_district  is 30 per cent. I use the thresholds of 
50, 70, and 90 per cent to check the magnitude changes of ethnic favoritism. 
    Table 14 displays the specific population share of a coethnic_district .  
Additionally, μ t  and γd denote year and district fixed effects, respectively, 
while X i is a vector of individual level controls includ ing dummies for religion, 
female, local minority and childhood spent in rural areas . A local minority in 
this chapter equals one for individuals who were non-Kikuyu as well as non-
Kalenjin in coethnic districts. An interaction term between local minority and 
coethnic_district  has also been included to check whether the effect of being in 
a coethnic_district  varies between coethnics and local minorities.  
 
Table 14 Population Shares of Coethnics in Coethnic Districts  
Population Share (%) 30-49 50-69 70-89 >90 
District Name Nairobi Laikipia  Nandi  Kirinyaga  
 
 
Nakuru Baringo Muranga 
 
 
Uasin Gishu Kericho Nyandarua  
 
  
Kiambu Nyeri  
 
  
West Pokot Elgeyo Marakwet  
Source: Author’s calculation  is based on 1989 census. When using 30 per cent as the 
threshold, the variable coethnic_district  includes all the districts listed above. While when 
the 50, 70 or 90 per cent thresholds are used, the last three, two or one column is included 
respectively.   
 
     To clarify whether ethnic favoritism operates along the ethnic dimension or 
at the district level, I include both variables of interest, coethnic as well as 
                                                        
1 5  The populat ion  shares  of  the dominant ethnic group in every d is t r ic t  remained re la t ive ly stab le in the 1969 ,  
1979 ,  and  1989 censuses ,  as  shown in Table 1.  The popula t ion share of  Kiku yu in  Kikuyu -dominant  dis t rict s  
ranges  from more than 30 per  cent  to g rea ter  than 90 per  cent ,  whi le the popula t ion  share of  Kalen jin in  
Kalen jin -dominant  d ist r ic t s ranges  from  more than 50 per  cent  to more than  90  per  cen t .  
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coethnic_district,  and controls for ethnic group (θe), district (γd) and year-fixed 
effects (μ t), as well as for individual characteristics (X i). Correspondingly, 
outcome variable Y ied t  denotes the primary educational attainment of individual  
i from ethnic group e in district d who reached primary school  age during year t.   
 
          Y iedt  =α0+α1Yd0 +α2coethnic i e t  +α3coethnic_district id t   
                                   +θe +μ t  +γd +X iA+ω i edt                              (7) 
 
    While acknowledging the fluidity of ethnic group, the self-report ethnic 
identity exploited in this chapter is considered to be stable and exogenous  at a 
specific time point . In addition, considering that the timing of the birth year is 
randomly determined, the causal effect of coethnicity with the president on 
educational attainment can be identified. In contrast, the variable of interest 
coethnic_district  is endogenous since people who highly value education may 
migrate to coethnic districts and it may affect the educational outcomes of their 
children as well. As a result, only a correlation between coethnic_district id t  and 
educational outcomes can be measured.  
 
4.4 Data 
    This chapter derives individual-level data from five KDHS rounds, 
conducted in 1993, 1998, 2003, 2008 and 2014. The KDHS was conducted six 
times between 1989 and 2014; however, this study excludes the 1989 KDHS 
because the male samples only include husbands of eligible women in the 
households interviewed, while surveys since 1993 hav e covered every eligible 
man in the households sampled. The total sample size for this period  comprised 
88,744 individuals, among whom 2,994 individuals spent most of their primary 
education time in the period before independence, which is used to calculate 
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the initial conditions of different ethnic groups. Thus , the remaining 85,750 
observations are used to measure the magnitude of ethnic favoritism.  
    Despite the KDHS being a standardized, nationally representative su rvey, 
the scope and coverage have differed over the previous 6 survey rounds. The 
newly available 2014 KDHS was the first county-representative survey in 
Kenya, while prior surveys had only been representative at the country and 
provincial level, and cannot therefore be used for county (dis trict) level 
analysis. Because a 2010 constitutional amendment changed the administrative 
units into counties, instead of the provinces and districts that had been used 
before, the 2014 KDHS no longer provides district -level information. In line 
with the 1989 census data, I recode 47 counties in the 2014 KDHS according to 
the original 41 district boundaries.
16
 The initial condition at the district level is 
also calculated using the 1989 census with a sample size of 489,290, collected 
from the Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS) - International.
17
 
Additionally, information concerning the dominant ethnic group in each district 
was collected from the official report of the population and housing census 
conducted by the Kenya National Bureau of Statistics.
18
 
 
 
                                                        
1 6  Accord ing to Sta toids ,  s ix new d ist r ic t s had been  crea ted  by 1989 :  
 “ In  Eastern  province,  Makueni  d is t r ic t  sp l i t  f rom Machakos,  and  Nith i  d is t r ic t  sp l i t  f rom Meru;  in  
Nyanza  province,  Migori  d ist r ic t  sp l i t  f rom Homa Bay,  and Nyamira  d ist r ict  sp l i t  f rom Kis i i ;  in  Ri f t  Valley 
province,  Bomet  dis t r ic t  sp l i t  f rom Kericho;  in  Western  province,  Vihiga  d ist r ict  sp li t  f rom Kakamega”  
(h t tp : / /www.sta toids.com/yke.html ,  accessed  on  Apri l  18,  2016. )  
1 7  IPUMS -  In ternational  p rovides  a  5  per  cen t  sample of  resp ondents  f rom the census .  The or igina l  sample s ize  
of  the 1989  IPUMS was  1 ,074,098 .  This  s tud y has  l imi ted  the sample  to respondents  aged  between  15  and  54  
for  consistency wi th  the KDHS data.   
1 8  Ken ya Nat ional  Bureau of  Sta t i st ics ,  avai lab le a t  
ht tp : / /www.knbs.or.ke/ index.php?opt ion=com_phocadownload&view=category&id=100&It emid=1176 ,  accessed  
on 18  Apri l  2016 .   
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4.5 Empirical Results  
4.5.1 How does Ethnic Favoritism Operate: Ethnic Dimension or District 
Level?  
      I first investigate whether ethnic favoritism operates at the ethnic group 
level. Considering that standard errors may correlate with each other within the 
same ethnic group, standard errors are clustered  at the ethnic group level in all 
specifications. Columns (1) and (8) of Table 15 replicate the estimated results 
of Kramon and Posner (2016), excluding KDHS data collected in 1989, and 
assume that ethnic favoritism has an immediate effect on primary education. 
The estimated results in columns (1) and (8) of Table 15 confirm that having a 
coethnic president during most of a student’s primary school years can be 
expected to increase the length of primary education by around 0.39 years and 
the probability of completing primary school by around 5 per cent, which is 
similar to the results, (0.39 years and 4 per cent, respectively), obtained by 
Kramon and Posner (2016). Column (2) controls for the initial condition by 
province and ethnicity, and the estimated magnitude indicates that early 
exposure to education during the colonial era at the ethnic grou p level did have 
a significant effect on educational attainment for the following generations. A 
comparison of coefficients between column (2) and column (3) shows that, 
after controlling for the province-ethnicity fixed effect, which includes supply-
side factors such as the availability of schools  during the colonial period, the 
magnitude of the effect of the initial condition decreases but is still positive ly 
significant. This result is consistent with Wantchekon, Klašnja and Novta 
(2015) who found that there was positive externality arising from education 
during the colonial era within a region. However, the effect of the initial 
condition decreases over time as shown in column (4) of Table 15. 
The estimated results of column (5), which additionally include 2014 
KDHS data, show that as primary education among Kenyan children improved, 
67 
the effects of coethnicity with the president and the initial condition on years 
of primary schooling sharply decrease and become not significant because of 
the upper limits inherent in primary education. However, the estimated results 
in columns (12) - (14), with primary completion as an outcome variable, 
demonstrate a consistent pattern of the effect of coethnicity  with the president 
over time. Coethnics of the president are expected to be more likely to 
complete primary education by around 4 per cent.  
Even when omitting the initial condition, columns (7) and (14) show a 
consistent effect of coethnicity with the president, which still increases the 
probability of completing primary education by 4 per cent after the province -
ethnicity fixed effect is taken into consideration. One concern arising from the 
small number of clusters is that the cluster -robust standard errors may be 
downwardly biased even after appropriate bias correction (Cameron, Gelbach, 
& Miller, 2008), therefore a wild cluster bootstrap method has been used to 
calculate standard errors to avoid over-rejection, and the estimated results are 
demonstrated in Appendix  3. The results are consistent with Table 15 where 
only clustered standard errors have been used.  
Evidence thus far shows that having a coethnic president during most of a 
student’s primary school years positively influences their educational 
attainment. Because it is stil l not clear whether ethnic favoritism operates at 
the ethnic dimension or at the district level, I estimate models (2) and (3) using 
KDHS 2014 data. In all the specifications, standard errors are clustered at the 
district level. As shown in column (6) of Table 16, people living in a district 
where the majority of citizens share ethnicity with the president are 5 per cent 
more likely to complete primary education. The average primary  completion 
rate during the colonial era was approximately 25 per cent, and for the whole 
sample following independence has been approximately 61 per cent. Therefore, 
sharing ethnicity with the president has a significant eff ect, which is equivalent 
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to an 8.2 per cent increase in the likelihood of completing primary education. 
Moreover, after controlling for various fixed effects, results in columns (7) - (9) 
provide evidence that ethnic favoritism operates at the district level but not at 
the ethnic dimension. One concern regarding clustering standard errors at the 
district level is that the neighboring districts within the same province share 
the same dominant ethnic group (see Figure 11), which may introduce spatial 
dependency in error terms; thus,  columns (5) and (10) of Table 16 cluster 
standard errors at the provincial level to correct for spatial correlation . 
Robustness checks using a wild cluster bootstrap to calculate standard errors 
are demonstrated in Appendix 3. In line with the results in Table 16, the effect 
of ethnic favoritism on primary completion has been shown to be robust at the 
district level regardless of which standard error is used.  
 
Figure 11 Dominant Ethnic Groups by District and Province  
 
Note: This figure  is created by the author based on the population share in 1989 census as 
shown in Table 10. The solid line denotes province boundaries.  The dark area demonstrates 
districts dominated by the Kikuyu (population share of Kikuyu >50 per cent),  while  the 
dotted areas denote districts dominated by the Kalenjin (population share of Kalenjin >50 per 
cent).   
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    Despite Kenyan districts being largely ethnically homogenous, the extent of 
ethnic homogeneity varies, as shown in Table 10. For example, in Kikuyu-
dominant districts, the population share of Kikuyu ranges from more than 30 per 
cent to more than 90 per cent. If ethnic favoritism functions through a supply -
side channel, then, in considering its efficiency, it is reasonable to expect that 
the magnitude of ethnic favoritism would increase in tandem with the 
population share of the dominant group. Therefore, I redefine the variable 
coethnic_district,  using different thresholds of the dominant ethnic groups’ 
population share, as detailed in Table 14. The estimated results are 
demonstrated in Table 17. Panel A of Table 17 shows that, in terms of primary 
schooling, the extent of the effect of ethnic favoritism does not vary 
significantly due to district homogeneity.  While people in a highly homogenous 
district are more likely to finish primary education, living in districts where 
more than 90 per cent of people share ethnicity with the president is likely to 
increase the possibility of completing primary education by around 7 per cent.  
This result is robust when clustering standard errors at the provincial level, as 
shown in Appendix 4.  
    Traditionally, there have been substantial sex differences in educational 
attainment (Lucas & Mbiti, 2012). The following estimated results in Table 18 
indicate that the effect of ethnic favoritism does not statistically vary by gender.  
    In addition, results in Table 19 also provide evidence that the magnitude of 
ethnic favoritism is not equal across ethnic groups, and its effect has been 
stronger under the two Kikuyu presidents. This result is possibly because,  
compared to the Kikuyu, the Kalenjin are a recently politicized ethnicity and 
consist of seven Nandi-speaking ethnic groups (Weber, Hiers, and Flesken 
2015).
19
 Thus, it is likely that the Kalenjin people demonstrate culturally 
heterogeneous preferences toward education; for example, the preferences of 
                                                        
1 9  Deta i led  in format ion  on the composi t ion of  the Kalen j in  i s  provided in  the note accompanying Table 12 .   
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the pastoral people, the Pokot, may vary from those of other Kalenjin sub -
groups as formal schooling is not typically a priority for pastoral people 
(Narman 1990).  
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Table 15 Ethnic Favoritism in Primary Education,  Ethnic Group Level  
  (1 )  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  (11)  (12)  (13)  (14)  
Outcome Variab le  Years  of  Primary Schooling  Primary Complet ion  
In i t ia l  Condit ion  
 
0.528**  0.193***  
 
0.170**  
   
0 .548***  0.275* 
 
0.262**  
  
  
(0 .133)  (0 .042)  
 
(0 .057)  
   
(0 .047)  (0 .115)  
 
(0 .073)  
  
In i t ia l  Condit ion * Time Trend  
   
-0 .000  
 
-0 .003  
    
0 .005  
 
0.003**  
 
    
(0 .002)  
 
(0 .002)  
    
(0 .003)  
 
(0 .001)  
 
Coethnic  0.389***  0.406***  0.391***  0.379***  0.200  0.185  0.194  0.045***  0.047***  0.044***  0.052***  0.041***  0.042***  0.040***  
 
(0 .039)  (0 .038)  (0 .040)  (0 .049)  (0 .146)  (0 .147)  (0 .148)  (0 .003)  (0 .003)  (0 .003)  (0 .006)  (0 .007)  (0 .006)  (0 .007)  
               
Ind ividual  Charac ter i st ics   Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Ethnici ty Fixed  Effec t  Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Year  Fixed  Effec t  Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Province*Ethnic i ty Fixed  Effect  N N Y Y Y Y Y N N Y Y Y Y Y 
               
Observat ions  41,852  41,753  41,753  41,753  85,461  85,461  85,750  41,852  41,753  41,753  41,753  85,461  85,461  85,750  
R-squared  0.270  0.294  0.322  0.321  0.327  0.327  0.326  0.119  0.139  0.149  0.149  0.154  0.153  0.152  
Note: Columns (1) and (8) replicate the estimated results in Kramon and Posner (2016) using KDHS 1993 -2008. KDHS 1993–2008 are also used for estimation 
in columns (2) -(4) and (9)-(11). Columns (5) -(7) and (12)-(14) additionally include KDHS 2014. Standard errors are clustered at the ethnic group level.  *,  ** 
and *** denote significance at the 10 per cent level,  5 per  cent level,  and 1 per cent level,  respectively.  
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Table 16 Ethnic Favoritism in Primary Education,  District Level  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Outcome Variable  Years of Primary Schooling  Primary Completion  
Initial Condition  0.303*** 0.299*** 
   
0.769*** 0.780*** 
   
 
(0.065) (0.062)  
   
(0.060) (0.056)  
   Initial Condition*Time Trend  
  
-0.021*** 
    
-0.011** 
  
   
(0.003) 
    
(0.004) 
  Coethnic  
 
-0.027 -0.060 -0.027 -0.027 
 
0.014 0.012 0.014 0.014 
  
(0.093)  (0.085) (0.093) (0.092) 
 
(0.016)  (0.016) (0.016) (0.011) 
Coethnic District  0.095 0.115 0.295*** 0.115 0.115 0.049*** 0.039*** 0.050*** 0.039*** 0.039*** 
 
(0.116) (0.116)  (0.084) (0.116) (0.151) (0.012) (0.011)  (0.011) (0.011) (0.009) 
           Individual Characteristics  Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Ethnicity Fixed Effect  N Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y Y 
Year Fixed Effect  Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
District Fixed Effect  Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
           Observations  43,898 43,898 43,898 43,898 43,898 43,898 43,898 43,898 43,898 43,898 
R-squared 0.393 0.393 0.402 0.393 0.393 0.208 0.208 0.209 0.208 0.208 
Note: KDHS 2014 is used for estimation. Standard errors in columns (1) -(4) and (6)-(9) are clustered at the district level,  while at the province level  in columns 
(5) and (10). *,  **,  and *** denote significance at  the 10 per cent level,  5 per cent level,  and 1 per cent level,  respectively.  
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Table 17 Ethnic Favoritism at the District Level,  Thresholds, and Local Minority  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Outcome Variable  Years of Primary Schooling  Primary Completion  
Threshold (per cent)  30 50 70 90 30 50 70 90 
Panel A         
Coethnic District  0.095 0.130 0.127 -0.029 0.049*** 0.052*** 0.055*** 0.074*** 
 
(0.116) (0.119) (0.148) (0.197) (0.012) (0.013) (0.016) (0.019) 
         Observations  43,898 43,898 43,898 43,898 43,898 43,898 43,898 43,898 
R-squared 0.393 0.393 0.393 0.392 0.208 0.208 0.208 0.208 
Panel B 
        Coethnic District  0.109 0.116 0.166 0.011 0.054*** 0.055*** 0.063*** 0.081*** 
 
(0.131) (0.133) (0.151) (0.202) (0.017) (0.018) (0.021) (0.021) 
Local Minority  0.395 0.110 0.526 0.865*** 0.088* 0.061 0.084 0.129** 
 
(0.357) (0.399) (0.370) (0.308) (0.047) (0.050) (0.053) (0.063) 
Coethnic District*Local Minority  -0.073 0.095 -0.336 -0.640*** -0.026 -0.018 -0.068 -0.128 
 
(0.223) (0.253) (0.201) (0.217) (0.032) (0.039) (0.051) (0.082) 
         Observations  43,898 43,898 43,898 43,898 43,898 43,898 43,898 43,898 
R-squared 0.393 0.393 0.393 0.393 0.208 0.208 0.208 0.208 
Note: KDHS 2014 is used for estimation. Standard errors clustered at the district level are shown in parentheses.  *,  **,  and *** denote significance at the 10 
per cent level,  5 per cent  level,  and 1 per cent level,  respectively. All the specifications cont rol for ethnicity fixed effect,  district fixed effect,  year fixed effect,  
dummies of religion, female as well as childhood in rural areas.    
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Table 18 Ethnic Favoritism in Primary Education by Gender  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Outcome Variable  Years of Primary Schooling  Primary Completion  
Coethnic District  0.115 -0.022 0.115 -0.022 0.039*** 0.045** 0.039*** 0.045* 
 
(0.116)  (0.155) (0.151) (0.183) (0.011) (0.018) (0.009) (0.020) 
Female Dummy 
 
-1.093*** 
 
-1.093** 
 
-0.171*** 
 
-0.171*** 
  
(0.235) 
 
(0.360) 
 
(0.025) 
 
(0.034) 
Coethnic District*Female Dummy  
 
0.199 
 
0.199 
 
-0.009 
 
-0.009 
  
(0.164) 
 
(0.146) 
 
(0.024) 
 
(0.028) 
         Observations  43,898 43,898 43,898 43,898 43,898 43,898 43,898 43,898 
R-squared 0.393 0.393 0.393 0.393 0.208 0.208 0.208 0.208 
Note: KDHS 2014 is used for estimation. Standard errors in columns (1),  (2),  (5) and (6) are clustered at the district level,  while in columns (3),  (4),  (7) and (8) 
are clustered at the province level.  *,  **,  and *** denote significance at the 10 per cent level,  5 per cent level,  and 1 per cent level,  respectively. All the 
specifications control for  ethnici ty fixed effect,  district fixed effect,  year fixed effect,  dummies of religion, female as w ell as childhood in rural areas.   
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Table 19 Ethnic Favoritism in Primary Education by President   
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Outcome Variable  Years of Primary Schooling  Primary Completion  
President  Kenyatta  Moi Kibaki  Kenyatta  Moi Kibaki  
 Panel A             
Coethnic District  0.136* 0.021 0.601*** 0.029 0.013 0.335*** 
 
(0.074) (0.088) (0.078) (0.023) (0.011) (0.020) 
       Observations  4,776 28,528 10,594 4,776 28,528 10,594 
R-squared 0.435 0.428 0.268 0.220 0.210 0.227 
        Panel B             
Coethnic District  0.136 0.021 0.601*** 0.029** 0.013** 0.335*** 
 
(0.077) (0.107) (0.113) (0.011) (0.005) (0.021) 
       Observations  4,776 28,528 10,594 4,776 28,528 10,594 
R-squared 0.435 0.428 0.268 0.220 0.210 0.227 
Note: KDHS 2014 is used for estimation. Standard errors in Panel A are clustered at the 
district level,  while  in Panel B are clustered at  the province level.  *,  **,  and *** denote 
significance at the 10 per cent level,  5 per cent level,  and 1 per cent level,  res pectively. All  
the specifications control for ethnicity fixed effect,  district fixed effect,  year fixed effect,  
dummies of religion, female, as well as childhood in rural areas.    
 
 4.5.2 How does Ethnic Favoritism Function: Supply-Side or Demand-Side 
Channels?   
    The evidence demonstrated to this point confirms that ethnic favoritism 
operates at the district level but not at the ethnic dimension. How exactly does 
it work? Does it function through supply-side channels or demand-side 
channels?  
    Even if ethnic favoritism is operating at the district level, whether the local 
minority can benefit from ethnic favoritism depends on the mechanism through 
which it operates. If it functions through supply-side channels, where more 
resources have been diverted to coethnic districts of the president through 
building more public schools or hiring more teachers, then local minorities may 
have a chance to access these resources as well. If it only functions though 
demand-side channels by increasing the expectation of educational returns, for 
example through giving a disproportionate share of public jobs to the coethnics 
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of the president, then the local minority would have less incentive to invest in 
education. To test whether there is a spillover effect within a coethnic district, 
and to shed light on the specific mechanisms through which ethnic favoritism 
operates, Panel B of Table 17 explicitly includes a dummy for a local minority 
in a coethnic_district  and an interaction term between it and the variable 
coethnic_district . The positive coefficients of the local_minority dummy 
indicate that living in a coethnic_district  improves the educational attainment 
of local minorities. In particular, local minorities in districts where more than 
90 per cent of people are coethnics of the president spend almost one more year 
at school and 12.9 per cent are more likely to complete primary education. This 
could be because Kikuyu- or Kalenjin-dominant districts obtain more 
educational inputs when their coethnics are in power, w hich supports a supply-
side mechanism effect.   
    However, the interaction term between the dummy of local_minority  and 
variable coethnic_district demonstrates a negatively significant effect in 
column (4) of the Panel B in Table 17. This result lends support to the effects 
of demand-side mechanisms since non-coethnic children may have a lower 
expectation of future educational returns compared with coethnic children. To 
give a hypothetical example, a Luhya child living in a Kikuyu -dominant 
district who spent the majority of his or her primary education under a Kikuyu 
president would stay 0.6 fewer years in primary schooling compared with peers 
whose ethnicity was Kikuyu.  
    One possible mechanism for increasing the expectations of educational 
returns is through the job market, and ethnic favoritism may also take the form 
of giving a disproportionate share of public jobs to the coethnics of the 
president, and this may lead to changes in educational outcomes as well. If this 
were the case, it is reasonable to expect that, with the same education level, 
age and sex, individuals in a coethnic_district  would be more likely to get a 
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public sector job. Unfortunately, the occupation category in the KDHS is not 
straightforward enough to identify whether an individual has been employed in 
the public or private sector. Therefore, I use 2009 census data from the 
Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS) - International and an 
empirical model specified in equation (8) to test the above hypothesis. The 
total sample size drawn from the 2009 census comprised 3,841,935 individuals, 
among whom 72,583 individuals (less than 2 per cent) were employed in the 
public sector.  
 
Public_Job
2009
id  =γ0 +γ1coethnic_district id t +μ t  +λd + Z iΓ+υ idt                    (8) 
  
    Among all people employed in the public sector, 5 per cent had not 
completed primary education, 15 per cent of them had completed primary 
education, and 66 per cent and 13 per cent had completed secondary and 
university education, respectively. Accordingly, having some primary 
education is considered to be the minimum threshold for a public sector job, 
and completing primary education greatly increases the likelihood of obtaining 
a public sector job. Because the 2009 census data are  cross-sectional, it was 
impossible to identify the age at which individuals began their employment. 
Given that the lowest age of people in the 2009 census employed in the public 
sector was 18, I assume that the earliest age for entering the job market was 18 
years of age. Correspondingly, the main variable of interest, coethnic_district idt , 
has been constructed to equal 1 if individual i is above 18 years old in year t in 
district d where the dominant ethnic group shares ethnicity with the president 
in year t. λd denotes the district fixed effect, which controls for the level of 
development by district. A cohort effect μ t  has been included to control for 
macroeconomic shocks. Z i includes individual characteristics , such as 
education level, age and sex. The outcome variable Public_Job
2009
id  equals 1 if 
individual i worked in the public sector in 2009. Because of repeat years, 
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delayed enrolment and the pursuit of further education, the real age for 
entering the job market may be higher than 18 years. I change the age threshold 
in the regression analysis and examine whether the effect of ethnic favoritism 
varies accordingly.   
 
Table 20 Ethnic Favoritism in Job Market  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Outcome Variable  Public Job 
Threshold (age>=)  18 20 22 24 26 
Panel A (coethnic share>50  per cent)  
     Coethnic District  0.005** 0.004* 0.004 0.002 0.001 
 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)  (0.003) (0.003) 
      Observations  3841935 3841935 3841935 3841935 3841935 
R-squared 0.109 0.109 0.109 0.109 0.109 
Panel B (coethnic share>70 per cent)  
     Coethnic District  0.006*** 0.005** 0.005** 0.003 0.002 
 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)  (0.002) (0.003) 
      Observations  3841935 3841935 3841935 3841935 3841935 
R-squared 0.109 0.109 0.109 0.109 0.109 
Panel C (coethnic share>90 per cent)  
     Coethnic District  0.005*** 0.005** 0.005** 0.005* 0.005 
 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)  (0.002) (0.003) 
      Observations  3841935 3841935 3841935 3841935 3841935 
R-squared 0.109 0.109 0.109 0.109 0.109 
Note: 2009 Population Census is used for estimation. Standard errors are clustered at the 
district level.  *,  **,  and  *** denote significance at the 10 per cent level ,  5 per cent level,  
and 1 per cent level,  respectively.  All the specifications control for distri ct fixed effect,  
year fixed effect,  age, female dummy, as well  as education attainment of individuals.  
Estimation in this table excludes Nairobi (coethnic share >30 per cent  & <50 per cent) since 
it  is the capital city of Kenya, whose job market is largely  different from other districts.        
 
    Table 20 displays the estimated resul ts of the effect of ethnic favoritism on 
public sector employment. The estimated results in Table 20 show that, given 
the same age, sex and education level, living in a coethnic_district  increases 
the likelihood of obtaining employment in the public sector by approximately 
0.5 per cent, especially for people who entered the job market at an early age 
(between 18-20 years old). Given that less than 2 per cent of the popula tion are 
79 
employed in the public sector, this is approximately equivalent to a 40 per cent 
increase in the likelihood of obtaining a job in the public sector. In addition, in 
a coethnic district where more than 90 per cent of people share ethnicity with 
the president, age does not appear significant, since the estimated coefficients 
are identical in columns (1) - (5) of Panel C in Table 20. This indicates that 
ethnic favoritism also occurs in the job market, which affects a demand -side 
mechanism of education, especially in more homogenous coethnic districts.     
    Estimation to this point has assumed that ethnic favoritism has an immediate 
effect on primary education. However, time lags may exist from the time that 
the president took power to the implementa tion of public policy. For example, 
if ethnic favoritism operates through a supply-side mechanism in which there is 
more investment in educational inputs (e.g. school construction and teacher 
recruitment), then children in coethnic districts who reach prim ary school age 
after the coethnic president takes power will access greater educational 
opportunities. This effect has been termed as a “policy implementation time 
lag”, and I recode the variable, coethnic_district , to interact with one- to three-
year lags. Columns (6) - (8) in Panel A of Table 21 generally confirm this 
pattern that children are more likely to complete primary school after one of 
their coethnics becomes president, for up to one to three years afterw ards.  
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Table 21 Ethnic Favoritism in Primary Education,  Time Lags  
  (1)  (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)  (7) (8) 
Outcome Variable  Years of Primary Schooling  Primary Completion  
Time Lags  None 1 year  2 years  3 years  None 1 year  2 years  3 years  
Panel A Policy Implementation Time Lag  
Coethnic District  0.095 0.109 0.114 0.129 0.049*** 0.050*** 0.046*** 0.053*** 
 
(0.116)  (0.147) (0.130) (0.119) (0.012) (0.017)  (0.016) (0.014) 
         Observations  43,898 43,898 43,898 43,898 43,898 43,898 43,898 43,898 
R-squared 0.393 0.392 0.392 0.393 0.208 0.208 0.208 0.208 
                  
Panel B Primary Start Time Lag  
 Coethnic District  0.095 0.104 0.130 0.108 0.049*** 0.049*** 0.049*** 0.045** 
 
(0.116)  (0.155) (0.161) (0.135) (0.012) (0.016)  (0.016) (0.018) 
         Observations  43,898 43,898 43,898 43,898 43,898 43,898 43,898 43,898 
R-squared 0.393 0.392 0.393 0.392 0.208 0.208 0.208 0.208 
Note: KDHS 2014 is used for estimation. Standard errors are clustered at the district level.  *,  **,  and *** denote significance at the 10 per 
cent level,  5 per cent level,  and 1 per cent level,  respectively. All the specifications control for ethnicity fixed eff ect,  district  fixed effect,  year 
fixed effect,  dummies of religion, female, as well as childhood in rural areas.  
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     If ethnic favoritism operates through a demand-side mechanism by 
increasing expectations on educational returns, then it is possible that over -
aged children in relation to normal primary schooling age may join or rejoin 
primary school when a coethnic becomes president. Therefore, this chapter has 
recoded the variable, coethnic_district , by including children who were 7-9 
years old (corresponding to 1-3 years lag in Panel B of Table 21) at the year 
when one of their coethnics became president. The estimated results in col umns 
(6) to (7) indicate that children who were over -aged by one or two years are 
equivalently likely to complete primary school as other primary school children, 
which supports a demand-side mechanism in relation to ethnic favoritism.  
 
4.6 Conclusions  
    Inequality in primary educational achievement has persisted in Kenya since 
its independence. Previous studies have used ethnic favoritism to explain the 
between-group inequality. However, this does not  explain why the within-
group difference is consistently large if ethnic favoritism benefits the coethnics 
of the president; that is if ethnicity is the only defining factor determining 
whether a student can benefit from ethnic favoritism or not. This chapter 
contributes to clarifying how ethnic favoritism operates, which is at the district 
level and not necessarily along the ethnic dimension.    
    Using primary education outcomes, this chapter confirms that ethnic 
favoritism is prevalent in Kenya, which has been shown in previous studies as 
well; however, the magnitude of the effect of ethnic favoritism on the years 
spent in primary schooling is decreasing in tandem with the improvement of  
education levels of Kenyan children. While the consistent result is that having 
a coethnic president increases the possibility of completing primary school by 
4 per cent, this effect is not equal for all coethnics of the sitting president. 
 82 
 
Only the coethnics living in coethnic districts benefit from this favoritism, 
which indicates that ethnic favoritism operates at the district level and also 
explains why the within-group difference is consistently large. Moreover, the 
extent of ethnic favoritism varies depending on each district’s population share 
of the president’s coethnics. Generally, the magni tude of the effect of ethnic 
favoritism increases as the population share of the dominant ethnic group 
increases in terms of the primary school completion rate. This also explains 
that part of the between-district (county) inequality comes from ethnic 
favoritism of the president.  
    Given that ethnic favoritism operates at the district level, does it function 
through supply-side or demand-side mechanisms? Because data on public 
expenditure in the education sector at the sub-national level is limited, this 
chapter could not show direct evidence concerning supply-side mechanisms of 
ethnic favoritism. Nevertheless, the estimated results in  Table 17 imply that 
ethnic favoritism may function due to a supply-side mechanism since local 
minorities in the coethnic districts have higher education attainment as well. 
With regard to a demand-side mechanism, the estimated results in Table 20 
provide direct evidence that a demand-side mechanism is related to ethnic 
favoritism in job markets, which affects educational outcomes through 
increasing future expectations regarding educational returns.  
    To summarize, the supply-side and demand-side mechanisms of ethnic 
favoritism imply that both within and between-ethnicity inequality may come 
from between-region (district) inequality. The location of residence not only 
determined the unequal access to educational resources but also affected the 
probability of getting public sector jobs, which jointly affect the education al 
outcomes.  
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Chapter 5 Ethnic Favoritism in Road Construction  
 
5.1 Introduction 
   Developing physical infrastructure is a prerequisite for economic growth and 
poverty reduction, as it helps to achieve economies of scale through integrating 
markets, promoting free mobility of resources (such as labor and raw material), 
creating employment, and boosting investment. On gaining independence, the 
Government of Kenya started to design and implement policies to promote 
economic growth and development (Wasike, 2001). Despite public budget 
limitations, road construction is the single largest expenditure item in the 
development account  for almost 4 decades (see Figure 12), and ranked the 
second in the government account before the 1980s (see Figure 9 in Chapter 4) 
in Kenya.  
 
Figure 12 Share of Development Account Expenditure  by Sector ,1963–2003  
 
Source: This figure is created by the author  based on  Statistical Abstract 1967–2003. 
Expenditures on roads and water are not available since 2004.  
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    Different from other public goods (such as education and health), which 
derive funding from harambee
20
 or the private sector, the network of roads is 
the principal transport facility provided and maintained by the Government of 
Kenya (World Bank, 1963). The president plays an important role in the 
allocation of road budgets since “request for road projects are fed into the 
Ministry of Public Works by provincial and district commissioners who… are 
nominated by the president, and then the Office of the President coordinates 
national decisions with the Ministry of Finance” (Burgess et al. 2015:1826).  
    The centrally allocated nature of road construction has made it a prime area 
of political patronage (Burgess et al., 2015). Thus, this chapter  focuses on the 
allocation of road construction expenditure derived from Burgess et al.  (2015) 
covering the period from 1963 to 2011. Specifically, three questions are 
investigated. First, how prevalent is ethnic favoritism in road construction in 
Kenya and how heterogeneous is it across different districts and regimes? 
Second, does democratization mitigate ethnic favoritism in a way that alters the 
targets of favored allocations? Third, how do multi -party election results shape 
the allocation of subsequent road expenditures over the following 5 years?   
    The remainder of this chapter  is structured as follows. I first review the 
extant literature. Then, the data and methodology are presented. Summaries 
will be provided after presenting empirical results.  
 
5.2 Literature Review 
     Studies about the provision of public goods and services in developing 
countries mainly focus on socially constructed identities (e.g., ethnic, 
linguistic, or religious groups) but not organized interest groups (Golden and 
                                                        
2 0  Harambee  i s  a  self -he lp  system,  which uses  “col lec t ive fundrais ing and  voluntary work to bu i ld  schools ,  
catt le d ips ,  c l in ics ,  and dispensaries  where the state was  unable to provide them” (Hornsby, 2013:138) .   
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Min, 2010). However, distributive politics in more-developed settings usually 
addresses whether politicians allocate goods to their core or swing voters, 
namely the core and swing voter debate.  
    The reason why previous studies on developing countries, especially African 
countries, “take a theoretically more relaxed view than the  swing versus core 
voter debate”  (Golden and Min 2010: 82) is twofold. First, linkages between 
politicians (or political parties) and voters is patronage -based (Baldwin, 2005; 
Kitschelt and Wilkinson, 2007) and thus many studies of African countr ies 
identify tribalism or ethnicity as an important factor influencing allocations 
(Bates, 1974). Second, most of African countries did not reintroduce multi -
party elections until the 1990s, and even after democratization, voters h ave 
tended to vote in alignment with their ethnic identities, which makes coethnics 
of the president (or their representative party) the beneficiaries of distributive 
politics.  
    The extant literature on ethnic favoritism in African countries has reveal ed 
that, in general, ethnic favoritism is prevalent (Burgess et al., 2015; Franck and 
Rainer, 2012; Kramon and Posner, 2016) and its magnitude depends on the 
specific policy areas one happens to study (Kramon and Posner, 2013). 
Especially, the seminal paper by Burgess et al. (2015:1820) finds that coethnic 
districts of the president “receive twice as much expenditure on roads…relative 
to what would be predicted by their population share”  and democratic 
transitions under the same president did reduce the degree of ethnic favoritism. 
However, that study overlooked important heterogeneities in ethnic favoritism 
not least in terms of how the introduction of multi -party election reshapes 
disproportionate resource allocation targets.  If the reason why politicians 
implement ethnic favoritism is to mobilize political  support, it seems that 
favoring his own ethnic group has proved to be insufficient in the Kenyan 
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context during the multi -party period since no single ethnic group in Kenya 
dominates as a proportion of the population. Thus, the question becomes, which 
districts did the president decide to favor in order to optimize his chances of 
political survival?   
    Research and debates on core and swing voters overwhelmingly focus on 
mature democracies in developed countries, not least because of the long 
history of democracy and the availability of data in those contexts. The 
fundamental formal model is due to Dixit and Londregan (1996), based on Cox 
and McCubbins (1986) and Lindbeck and Weibull (1987), and explores which 
type of voter receives disproportionate allocations within a single electoral 
district. It turns out that parties may engage in targeting both core and swing 
voters. If the parties can deliver transfers to any group in an equally effective 
manner, they will engage in swing voter targeting; however, if each party can 
only effectively deliver favors to its supporters, they will choose to favor these 
core voters (Dixit and Londregan, 1996). Although empirical studies yield 
mixed results on this debate, the swing voter hypothesis is often supported 
(Golden and Min, 2010).  
    One problem facing studies on core and swing voters is tha t the hypothesis 
assumes that politicians are willing and able to allocate a disproportionate 
share of resources as a reward for changing voting preference. If voters have 
the option of not voting, Nichter (2008) predicts and empirically verifies that 
parties target core voters in order to increase the turnout rate which he terms as 
“turnout buying.”  
    Another problem of the core or swing voter hypothesis is that it concerns 
individuals while data on resource a llocation is usually aggregated to electoral 
units or above (Golden and Min, 2010). Using the concept of the margin of 
victory as a minimal definition of core and swing, Vaishnav and Sircar (2010) 
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contend that the government of Tamil Nadu engaged in “vote rewarding” in the 
first 2 years, and also targeted “swing” constituencies with small margins.  
    Empirical evidence for other developing countries is equivocal as well. In 
Senegal, Caldeira (2012) finds that the government targeted intergovernmental 
fiscal transfers in swing local governments. However, in Tanzania, Weinstein 
(2011) provides evidence that the incumbent favors districts with a large 
margin of victory. Furthermore, many empirical results in developing country 
contexts “fit neither the core nor the swing hypothesis, nor …  speak to the 
vote-buying versus turnout buying debate” (Golden and Min, 200: 82). For 
instance, Baldwin (2005) finds that politicians in Mali distribute jobs to areas 
where opposition activities are more likely. Similarly, findings by Toha (2009) 
and Treisman et al. (1996) show that disproportionate allocations go to regions 
that threatened the stability of regimes in Indonesia and post-Soviet Russia, 
respectively. These counterintuitive results can also be witnessed in Ghana 
where intergovernmental transfers , as well as public good allocations , have 
favored districts which voted for the opposition  (André and Mesplé-Somps, 
2011; Banful, 2011a, 2011b).  
    Therefore, this chapter contributes to the literature on distributive politics i n 
the following respects. First, it shows that ethnic favoritism in road 
expenditure is a heterogeneous phenomenon. Second, it explains political 
motivations behind the heterogeneity of disproportionate resource allocation.  
 
5.3 Data and Methodology  
This chapter derives district-level panel data on road construction in Kenya 
from Burgess et al. (2015), which includes data on road expenditure covering 
the 1963–2011 period. Those authors utilized data from multiple sources 
including the Development Estimates of Kenya. Since the Kenyan government 
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“finances maintenance of trunk roads and secondary roads from its recurrent 
budget” (World Bank 1963: 8)， and the government of Kenya didn’t place 
more emphasis on road maintenance until the late 1990s (Wasike, 2001), road 
expenditure used in this chapter  is generally for the construction of new roads.   
Following Burgess et al. (2015), this study first reports on a descriptive 
graphical analysis, which normalizes data on district -level road expenditure in 
per capita and per unit area terms. Clearly, despite their intuitive appeal, visual 
trends cannot substitute for quantitative analyses. The empirical model of this 
chapter is as follows:  
 
     Road_Expendituredt = γd+α t+ δ1*coethnic_districtdt  
                                      +θ (Xd1963*[t−1963])+ μdt                (9a) 
 
     Road_Expendituredt = γd+α t+ δ1*coethnic_districtdt  
                                                          +sd*t+ μdt                    (9b) 
 
where the outcome variable is the natural logarithm of road expenditure (in 
constant 2000 US dollars) in district d at year t. In order to measure the 
magnitude of ethnic favoritism, a dummy variable is employed, termed 
coethnic_district ; this takes the value 1 if more than half of the population in 
district d shares ethnicity with the president at time  t following Burgess et al . 
(2015). It controls for district fixed effects  γd, year fixed effects α t, and a 
vector of baseline variables Xd1963 to isolate the effect of other factors on road 
construction. As a robustness check, district specific time trend sd*t is 
controlled for instead of baselines controls as specified in equation (9b).  
    Baseline controls are derived from various sources. Wasike (2001) 
summarized post-independence road infrastructure policies in Kenya, 
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emphasizing the strategy of the Kenyan government to develop agriculture 
especially in regions with high agricultural potential and high production of 
cash crops. Thus, this chapter controls for areas of land with high and medium 
potential in 1963; these data were obtained from Statistical Abstract 1967. The 
value of cash crop production in 1965 is also controlled for since it is 
reasonable to expect that roads are  prioritized to be built in agriculturally 
active areas and districts. In addition, policy initiatives also aimed at reducing 
transportation costs of agricultural commodities from rural area s to markets in 
order to draw the entire country into the market economy (Wasike 2001). 
Therefore, the model specification includes geographic, demographic, and 
commercial factors in the baseline controls. Geographic factors include a 
dummy for the Mombasa–Nairobi–Kampala corridor, a dummy for districts 
bordering Uganda or Tanzania, and the centroid euclidean distance to Nairobi  
(in kilometers). Demographic factors include district area size and population 
adjusted for boundary changes made since 1963, which were also obtained from 
Statistical Abstract 1967 . Urbanization rate in 1962, total earnings from wage 
employment in 1966, and the number of wage employment (in thousands) in 
1963 are also included as measurements of economic activ ities, which are all 
derived from Burgess et al. (2015). The reason baseline controls are used is due 
to the concern of simultaneous bias.  
    Even when controlling for the baseline social and economic factors, which 
may predict the allocation of road expenditure, the variable of interest 
coethnic_district  may be endogenous due to omitted variable bias. For instance, 
due to the coethnic with the president, the coethnic_district  may receive more 
expenditure in other sectors (such as education , health), which may result in 
better developmental outcomes in these districts. As a result, more road 
expenditure may be allocated to coethnic_district  because of higher returns to 
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investment in road sectors. Thus, only a correlation between the 
coethnic_district and road expenditure can be measured when estimating 
equation (9a) and equation (9b).  
    Additionally, considering the heterogeneous nature of coethnic districts, I 
further differentiate  this variable into categories as detailed in Table 22. 
Coethnic_dominant_district  denotes districts where more than 75 per cent of 
the people are coethnic with the president. Coethnic_minor_dominant_district  
denotes districts where more than 50 percent but less than 75 per cent of the 
people are coethnic with the president. The reason why 75% is specified as the 
threshold for differentiating districts is that the “25 Percent Rule”21 of Kenyan 
elections makes districts where more than 75% of people are coethnic to the 
president the absolute strongholds of him.  
 
Table 22 Classification of Districts in Kenya  
Coethnic Dominant  
 
 
 
Coethnic Minor Dominant 
 
Kikuyu Dominant  Kalenjin Dominant  Kikuyu Minor Dominant  Kalenjin Minor Dominant  
Kiambu, 
Kirinyaga, 
Muranga, Nyeri,  
Nyandarua  
Elgeyo Marakwet, 
Baringo, Kericho,  
West Pokot 
Nakuru, Laikipia  Nandi,  Uasin Gishu  
Note: Refer to Table 10  to observe that  the population shares of dominant ethnic groups did 
not change that  much over time. Classificat ion  of districts is reasonably consistent over time 
regardless of which population census is used.   
 
                                                        
21
 The “25 per cent rule”  demotes that “the winning presidential candidate must secure 25 
per cent of the vote in at least five of Kenya ’s eight provinces”  (Hornsby, 2013:511).  
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5.4 Results  
5.4.1 Graphical Analysis  
    Different from Burgess et al. (2015) who suggested that districts that share 
ethnicity with the president have largely benefited from road construction since 
independence, the descriptive analysis herein shows that using different 
measures of outcome variables leads to different conclusions about ethnic 
favoritism.  
 
Figure 13 District -Level Road Expenditure in Kenya, 1 963–2011 
 
Note: Figure 13(a) replicates Figure 5 of Burgess et al. (2015)  which plots the ratio between 
the road expenditure share and the population share in 1962 in district d  at year t .  
Kikuyu_district,  Kalenjin_district,  and  other_district take the value of 1 if more than 50% of 
the population in district d  are Kikuyu, Kalenjin, or other,  respectively. The population 
share in 1962 is adjusted for boundary changes after independence in 1963. Figure 13(b) 
plots the ratio between the road expenditure share and the area share in 1963 in district d  at  
year t .  Figures 13 (c) and (d) replicate (a) and (b),  respectively, but further differentiate  
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districts based on Table 24 . The two vertical dashed lines in (a) through (d) show changes 
from a Kikuyu president  to a Kalenjin president in 1978 and from a Kalenjin president to a 
Kikuyu president in 2002. The two vertical solid l ines in (a) through (d) demonstrate regime 
type changes from a mult i -party system to a de facto  one-party regime in 1969 and from a de 
jure  one-party regime to a multi -party system in 1992.  
 
    Figure 13(a) replicates Figure 5 of Burgess et al. (2015) which shows that 
after the death of the first Kikuyu president in 1978, the trend of favoring 
Kikuyu districts was replaced by an increase in road expenditure in Kalenjin 
districts. Figure 13(b), which plots the ratio of the road expenditure share to 
the area share, displays a strikingly different pattern: during the majority of 
this period, Kikuyu districts received a disproportionate share of road 
expenditure.  
    Figures 13(c) and (d) further categorize districts according to their 
population shares of  Kikuyu and Kalenjin as explained in Table 22. Figure 13(c) 
shows that neither Kikuyu_dominant_district  nor Kalenjin_dominant_district  is 
the largest beneficiary of road expenditure  since independence. In contrast, 
Kikuyu_minor_dominant_district , as well as Kalenjin_minor_dominant_district , 
benefited most from road construction before and after the 1990s, respectively.  
    Figure 13(d) shows that during most of the post -independence era, 
Kikuyu_dominant_district  was largely favored in terms of road expenditure. It 
received more than five times as much money relative to its area share in the 
country not only under the Kikuyu president but also under the Kalenjin 
president during the 1980s. Nevertheless, even though the majority of the 
districts experienced a substantial decrease in road expenditure in the 1990s, 
Kalenjin_minor_dominant_district  received more than 10 times as much money 
relative to its area share.  
    Notwithstanding the fact that different implications can be drawn from the 
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temporal trends in Figure 13, one unifying conclusion is that ethnic favoritism 
in road expenditure is a heterogeneous process and its pattern does not 
necessarily change toward favoring the new president’s coethnic districts or 
districts where the populat ion share of his coethnics is large. In addition, it 
seems that the arrival of multi -party elections has had little influence on the 
magnitude of ethnic favoritism but instead altered targets of favored allocation 
of resources. Moreover, both Figure 13(c) and Figure 13(d) show that 
Kalenjin_minor_dominant_district  largely benefited from road expenditure no 
matter whether normalization of road expenditures is computed based on the 
population share or the area share  after the reintroduction of multi-party 
elections in 1992. It is not clear what the motivations are behind this altered 
target of favored allocation. Thus, the questions of what can better predict the 
allocation of road expenditure in post -independence Kenya, and how did 
changes in ethnicity of the president and regime type reshape targets of favored 
allocations are empirical ones.  
 
5.4.2 Empirical Analysis 
    For the purpose of quantifying the heterogeneity of ethnic favoritism in road 
expenditure, this chapter then moves to empirical analysis as explained above. 
Columns (1) and (2) of Table 23 show the estimated results of equation (9a) 
controlling for year and district fixed effects as well as baseline controls 
interacted with linear time trends.  The estimated results of equation (9b), 
which is shown in columns (3) and (4) include district specific time trends 
instead of the linear time trend of baseline controls, and generate similar 
estimated results compared to columns (1) and (2).  
    The estimated results of columns (1) and (3) in Table 23 show that ethnic 
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favoritism is prevalent in road construction during the post -independence 
period after isolating the effects of various baseline controls or district -specific 
time trends. Indeed, on average the coethnic_district  received more than three 
times the amount of road expenditures. Although the magnitude of favoritism is 
heterogeneous among coethnic districts, only coethnic_dominant_district  where 
more than 75% of the people are coethnics to the  president received around 
four times as much road expenditure as displayed in columns (2) and (4) of 
Table 23.  
 
Table 23 Ethnic Favoritism in Road Construction  
  (1)  (2) (3) (4) 
Outcome Variables  Ln Road Expenditure  
Coethnic District  2.111**   2.008**   
 
(0.895) 
 
(0.800) 
 
Coethnic Dominant  
 
3.107*** 
 
2.910*** 
  
(1.075) 
 
(0.956) 
Coethnic Minor Dominant  
 
−0.100  
 
−0.020  
  
(0.803) 
 
(0.764) 
     Year Fixed Effect  Y Y Y Y 
District Fixed Effect  Y Y Y Y 
Baseline Controls*Time Trend Y Y N N 
District Specific Time Trend  N N Y Y 
     
Number of Clusters  41 41 41 41 
Observations  2,009 2,009 2,009 2,009 
R-squared 0.484 0.489 0.084 0.089 
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the district level are in parentheses .  *,  ** and *** 
denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels,  respectively.  
 
    The uniqueness of the Kenyan case is that it not only experienced a shift 
between one-party and multi-party regimes under the same president  but also 
experienced a shift between presidents from different ethnic groups under the 
same type of regime as delineated in Figure 14. It is natural to expect that the 
 95 
 
pattern of ethnic favoritism would differ under different presidents and regime 
types, as per what can be observed in Figure 13(c) and (d). Thus, in Table 24, I 
categorize coethnic_district according to the explanation put forward in Table 
22. It turns out that neither Kikuyu_dominant_district  nor 
Kalenjin_dominant_district  received more road expenditure (see column (1) of 
Table 24), and on average, Kikuyu_minor_dominant_district  as well as 
Kalenjin_minor_dominant_district  benefited more in the post-independence 
period. Indeed, this is consistent with the visualization in Figure 1 3(c). 
 
Figure 14 Political and Leadership Transitions in Kenya, 1963–2011 
 
Source: I  created this figure  based on Burgess et al.  (2015). The first row in each square 
denotes the name of the president; the second row denotes the ethnicity of the president; and 
the last row denotes the regime type. The years specified below the square denote the year  
of starting and ending of a certain regime  type under a certain president.   
    
    I further differentiate between regimes; see columns (2)–(6) of Table 24. 
Therein different regimes demonstrate divergent patterns and these patterns are 
broadly consistent with Figure 13(c). Under the Kenyatta regime between 1963 
and 1978 (see columns (2) and (3)) as well as the Kibaki regime (see column 
(6)), road expenditure was not biased toward coethnic districts. Even during the 
one-party period between 1970 and 1978, the estimated coefficients exhibit 
positive signs but are insignificant at conventional levels. However, after 
President Moi took office, not only Kalenjin_dominant_district  but 
Kikuyu_minor_dominant_district were strongly favored between 1979 and 1992.  
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This pattern changed drastically after the reintroduction of multi -party 
elections in 1992. Only districts where Kalenjin had minor advantages were 
favored in the subsequent multi -party period and, again, this is consistent with 
the visualization in Figure 13(c). 
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Table 24 Ethnic Favoritism by Regime  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Outcome Variable  Ln Road Expenditure  
President Ethnicity    Kikuyu Kikuyu Kalenjin  Kalenjin  Kikuyu 
Period 1963–2011 1963–1969 1970–1978 1979–1992 1993–2002 2003–2011 
Kikuyu Dominant District  −1.358* −0.407 0.981 0.251 −2.577* −5.582*** 
 
(0.742) (1.777) (1.279) (1.704) (1.458) (1.890) 
Kikuyu Minor Dominant District  0.845* −2.282* 0.880 3.179* −0.071 0.629 
 
(0.437) (1.316) (1.881) (1.730) (2.006) (1.107) 
Kalenjin Minor Dominant District  1.971*** 0.096 1.565 2.540 4.563*** 0.068 
 
(0.555) (1.947) (1.399) (2.367) (1.331) (2.091) 
Kalenjin Dominant District  −0.976* −6.014*** −3.192*** 4.484*** 0.012 −4.432*** 
 
(0.504) (1.437) (1.007) (1.437) (1.049) (0.976) 
       
Year Fixed Effect  Y Y Y Y Y Y 
District Fixed Effect  N N N N N N 
Baseline Controls  Y Y Y Y Y Y 
       
Observations  2,009 287 369 574 410 369 
R-squared 0.444 0.583 0.471 0.593 0.573 0.486 
Note: Robust standard errors clustered at the distr ict level are in parentheses .  *,  **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels,  
respectively. 
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5.5 Difference-in-Differences Estimates  
    As explained earlier that the estimated coefficient of coethnic_districtdt  
cannot be interpreted as a causal one due to the concern of omitted variable 
bias. In order to show that temporal increases in road expenditure are a 
function of incumbent coethnics  rather than other potential confounders, a 
Difference-in-Differences (DID) strategy is applied through subtracting the 
effect of ethnicity when a district’s coethnic is in power from its effect when 
their coethnic is not in power.  
    The political history of post-independence Kenya provides three natural 
experiments that can be used to examine both the effect of regime change on 
the magnitude of ethnic favoritism as well as the effect of coethnicity with the 
president as explained previously in Figure 14.  
    The natural death of President Kenyatta in 1978 makes it possible to 
measure the effect of coethnic with the president on road expenditure 
allocation. In order to isolate the potential effect of different regime types, the 
pre-treatment period only includes the de facto  one-party period under 
President Kenyatta from 1970 to 1978 and assumes that constraints on the 
executive power of the president are constant despite the fact that President 
Moi becomes more autocratic after the coup in 1982 (Hornsby, 2013). And the 
post-treatment period includes the one-party period under President Moi from 
1979 to 1992. When President Moi was in power, Kalenjin_district  is 
categorized as the treatment group, while non-Kalenjin_district is the control 
group. Thus, the DID model can be specified as follows:   
 
Road_Expendituredt =  γd + α t  + δd*t  
    +βDID (Kalenjin_districtd* Moi_regime_one_party t)  +εdt                    (10) 
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    Using the terminology of potential outcomes, let Y1dt  denote the road 
expenditure in district d and period t if it is in the treatment group, namely the 
Kalenjin_district , and let Y0dt be the road expenditure in district d and period t 
if it is in the control group.  
 
Figure 15 Visualization of the Difference -in-Differences (DID) Strategy  
 
Note: This figure is created by the author .  
 
    The key identifying strategy here is that the difference between the 
counterfactual difference (DB in Figure 15) and the observed difference of 
control districts (CA in Figure 15) can be fully captured by the district fixed 
effects and district-specific time trend in the absence of the treatment. In other 
words, I need to show that, after isolating the effect of district fixed effects, 
year fixed effects and district-specific time trends, there is no statistical 
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difference in road expenditure between Kalenjin_district  and Other_district  
during the one-party period of the Kenyatta regime.   
 
Road_Expendituredt =  γd + α t  + δd*t  
     +β1  (Kalenjin_districtd* Kenyatta_regime_one_party t)   
    +β2 (Other_districtd* Kenyatta_regime_one_party t)  +εdt                    (11)  
 
    Thus, I estimate equation (11) specified above and the estimated results are 
shown in Table 25.  
Table 25 Verificat ion of Common Trend Assumption , 1963−1978  
Outcome Variable  Ln Road Expenditure  
 
(1) (2) 
Kalenjin District*Kenyatta Regime One-party  2.268 
 
 
(3.117) 
 
Other District* Kenyatta Regime One-party 1.891 1.89 
 
(1.601) (1.602) 
Kalenjin Dominant District* Kenyatta Regime One-party 
 
2.731 
  
(4.395) 
Kalenjin Minor Dominant District*  Kenyatta Regime One-party 
 
1.343 
  
(1.614) 
Linear Time Trend  Y Y 
Year Fixed Effect  Y Y 
District Specific Time Trend  Y Y 
   
P-value of F-test: β1 =  β2   0.899  
Number of Clusters  41 41 
Observations  656 656 
Adjusted R-squared 0.361 0.361 
Note: Robust standard errors clustered at the district level are in parentheses .  *,  **,  and *** 
denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels,  respectively.   
 
    The estimated results show that during the one-party period of the Kenyatta 
regime from 1970 to 1978, after controlling for various fixed effects and time 
trends, neither Kalenjin_district  nor Other_district received disproportionate 
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shares of road expenditure. The hypothesis that β1 equals  β2 cannot be rejected 
at the conventional significance level.  
    Then I proceed to show the effect of coethnicity with the president on road 
expenditure using equation (10) and the estimated results are shown in Table 26. 
 
Table 26 Effect of Coethnicity with the President ,  1970−1992 
Outcome Variable  Ln Road Expenditure  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Kalenjin District  
4.728 5.006 
   
        *Moi Regime One-Party  
(3.220) (3.277) 
   
Kalenjin Dominant District    
8.694*** 8.971*** 8.971*** 
        * Moi Regime One-Party   
(2.950) (3.009) (2.997) 
Kalenjin Minor Dominant District    
−3.202 −2.925 −2.925 
         * Moi Regime One-Party   
(1.929) (2.005) (1.997) 
Kikuyu Dominant District    
  
0.097 
         * Moi Regime One-Party   
  
(2.065) 
Kikuyu Minor Dominant District    
  
4.612** 
         * Moi Regime One-Party   
  
(1.800) 
    
Linear Time Trend  Y Y Y Y Y 
Year Fixed Effect  Y Y Y Y Y 
District Specific Time Trend  Y Y Y Y Y 
 
     
Number of Clusters  
41 41 41 41 41 
Observations  
943 782 943 782 943 
Adjusted R-squared 
0.296 0.336 0.313 0.353 0.316 
Note: Robust standard errors clustered at the district level are in parentheses .  *,  **,  and *** 
denote significance at the 10%, 5 %, and 1% levels,  respectively. Columns (2) and (4) 
exclude Kikuyu_district  in the reference group.  
  
    One problem of using all non-Kalenjin districts as the reference group is  that, 
even after controlling for various time trends, road expenditure received by the 
Kikuyu_district  may still deviate from common year effects because of ethnic 
favoritism during the President Kenyatta era  compared with other non-Kalenjin 
districts. As a result, βDID may be upward biased because it may include the 
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effect of ethnic favoritism during the Kenyatta regime. Therefore, in columns 
(2) and (4) of Table 26, Kikuyu_district  is excluded in the reference group in 
order to measure the magnitude of ethnic favoritism more precisely.  
    When comparing coefficients in columns (1) and (2) ,
22
 it is worth noting that 
after excluding Kikuyu_district  in the reference group, the estimated 
coefficient increased which is contrary to what was predicted earlier.  
Enlightened by the estimation results in column (4) of Table 24, the only 
explanation is that the Kikuyu_minor_dominant_district  may receive a 
disproportionate share of road expenditure even under the Moi regime. 
Therefore I include the interaction terms of four categories of districts with the 
one-party period dummy of the Moi regime. The estimated results in column (5) 
of Table 26 support this explanation by showing that after Moi took power in 
1978, road expenditure received by Kikuyu_minor_dominant_district  increased 
more than four times.  
 
Road_Expendituredt =  γd + α t  + δd*t  
       +βDID_regime  (Kalenjin_districtd* moi_regime_multi_party t)  +εdt            (12)  
 
    Analysis thus far identifies the impact of coethnic  with the president on road 
expenditure, then how about the effect of regime type  change? Whether 
transition into a multi-party regime can help to mitigate the magnitude of 
ethnic favoritism? In order to answer this question, I estimate equation (12) 
and the estimated results are shown in Table 27. I also include the interaction 
                                                        
2 2  Comparing the es t imated  coeff ic ients  in columns (3)  and  (4)  can  draw the same conclusion.   
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terms of four categories of districts with the multi -party period dummy of the 
Moi regime to check whether regime type change may affect other districts as 
well. 
 
Table 27 Effect of Reintroduction of Mult i -Party Election, 1979–2002   
Outcome Variable  Ln Road Expenditure  
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Period 1979–1997 1979–2002 
Kalenjin District  −2.225  
 
−2.144  
 
       *Moi Regime Multi -Party  (1.682) 
 
(1.596) 
 
Kalenjin Dominant District  
 
−1.209  
 
−0.885  
         * Moi Regime Multi-Party 
 
(2.268) 
 
(2.026) 
Kalenjin Minor Dominant District  
 
−4.426***  
 
−4.768***  
         * Moi Regime Multi-Party 
 
(0.735) 
 
(0.690) 
Kikuyu Dominant District  
 
−1.149  
 
−0.918  
          * Moi Regime Multi-Party 
 
(0.981) 
 
(1.067) 
Kikuyu Minor Dominant District  
 
1.879** 
 
1.676** 
          * Moi Regime Multi-Party 
 
[0.745] 
 
(0.700) 
     Linear Time Trend  Y Y Y Y 
Year Fixed Effect  Y Y Y Y 
District Specific Time Trend  Y Y Y Y 
     
Number of Clusters  41 41 41 41 
Observations  779 779 984 984 
Adjusted R-squared 0.439 0.443 0.549 0.551 
Note: Robust standard errors clustered at the district level are in parentheses.  *,  **,  and *** 
denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels,  respectively.  
 
    A key result of Burgess et al. (2015) is that they found no ethnic favoritism 
in road spending during the period of democracy in Kenya. However, a s will be 
shown, even though the introduction of a multi -party system did reduce the 
magnitude of ethnic favoritism in Kalenjin_district in general, it did not 
prevent the president from discriminating other districts since road expenditure 
received by the Kikuyu_minor_dominant_district  increased around twice as 
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much compared with other districts as shown in columns (2) and (4) of Table 
27. Similarly, Table 28 demonstrates that road expenditure was biased toward 
Kikuyu_dominant_district  again when Kibaki became president in 2002.  
 
Table 28 Effect of Change in  President ’s  Ethnicity ,  1993–2007 
  
Outcome Variable  Ln Road Expenditure  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
1993–2007 1993–2011 
Kikuyu District  2.169   1.672   
       *Kibaki Regime Dummy (1.960) 
 
(1.679) 
 
Kikuyu Dominant District  
 
2.606* 
 
1.515 
       *Kibaki Regime Dummy 
 
(1.295) 
 
(1.437) 
Kikuyu Minor Dominant District  
 
−0.943 
 
0.026 
       *Kibaki Regime Dummy 
 
(5.202) 
 
(4.046) 
Kalenjin Dominant District  
 
−0.648 
 
−1.506 
       *Kibaki Regime Dummy 
 
(3.027) 
 
(3.242) 
Kalenjin Minor Dominant District  
 
−8.519*** 
 
−6.889* 
       *Kibaki Regime Dummy 
 
(2.661) 
 
(3.683) 
     Linear Time Trend  Y Y Y Y 
Year Fixed Effect  Y Y Y Y 
District Specific Time Trend  Y Y Y Y 
     
Number of Clusters  41 41 41 41 
Observations  615 615 779 779 
Adjusted R-squared 0.491 0.499 0.482 0.486 
Note: Robust standard errors clustered at the district level are in parentheses  *, **, and *** 
denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels,  respectively.  
 
5.6 Political Motivations for Disproportionate Allocation of Road 
Expenditure  
    Democratization since 1992 reduces the magnitude of ethnic favoritism to 
some extent and this decrease in ethnic favoritism may not translate simply to 
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stronger constraints on the executive power of the president (Burgess et al.,  
2015), but also from altered targets of favored allocation as indicated in Table 
27. Thus, how did the election results shape the allocation of resources in the 
following 5 years? Using the model specified below, I further explore how 
election results affected road expenditures.  
 
Road_Expendituredt =  γd + α t  + φ1*election_resultdt + 
                              θ(Xd1963*[t−1963]) + μdt                              (13) 
 
    Election_result  here is measured by various indicators—specifically, 
approval ratings of the current president, the margin of victory, turnout rate, 
and the proportion of swing voters in the district. The margin of victory is 
calculated by the percentage of votes obtained by the incumbent in the last 
election minus the percentage of votes obtained by the leading opposit ion party 
in district d. One convenient characteristic of ethnic politics is that “voting in 
Kenya is primarily along ethnic lines” (Morjaria, 2011: 9) since people usually 
assume that having a coethnic leader will increase the resources they will get 
(Posner, 2005). Therefore, it is reasonable to consider the coethnics of the 
president as core voters and coethnics of his opponents as opponents’ voters as 
Horowitz (1985:332) indicated that “what is uncertain is not how a  voter will 
vote… all that is uncertain is whether a potential voter will vote” . In addition, 
following Horowitz (2017), swing voters in this study are defined as voters 
from ethnic groups without a coethnic leader in the election. Using the 1989 
population census, the shares of various  voters correspond to their district level 
population shares.  
    Considering that official election data and media reports in Kenya are not 
consistent over various sources (Nohlen, Krennerich, and Thibaut, 1999), this 
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chapter derives constituency level results for the 1992 election from Throup 
and Hornsby (1998) and aggregates them at the district level.  
 
Table 29 Electoral Motivation of Road Expenditure Allocation, 1993 –1997 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Outcome Variable  
 
Ln Road Expenditure  
Approval Rate  1.910     
 (3.748)     
Approval Rate ^2 −0.552     
 (3.282)     
Margin of Victory 
 
0.522 
   
 
 
(0.500) 
   
Margin of Victory ^2 
 
0.052 
   
 
 
(0.817) 
   
Turnout  
 
 
62.374*** 
 
57.334** 
 
 
 
(23.033) 
 
(23.898) 
Turnout^2  
 
 
−44.072** 
 
−44.775*** 
 
 
 
(16.511) 
 
(16.449) 
Swing Voter Share  
 
  
0.091* 0.048 
 
 
  
(0.050) (0.043) 
Swing Voter Share^2  
 
  
−0.001** −0.001 
 
 
  
(0.000) (0.000) 
 
 
    
Year Fixed Effect  
Y Y Y Y Y 
District Fixed Effect  
N N N N N 
Baseline Controls  
Y Y Y Y Y 
 
 
    
Observations  205 205 205 205 205 
R-squared 0.591 0.589 0.617 0.602 0.631 
Note: Robust standard errors clustered at the district level are in parentheses .  *,  **,  and *** 
demonstrate  significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels,  respectively.  
 
    The election-related results are shown in Table  29, which provides evidence 
that both the approval rate of the President Moi and the margin of victory fail 
to predict the allocation of road expenditure but the turnout rate as well as the 
share of swing voters matter.  Column (3) of Table 29 demonstrates that the 
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association between road expenditure and the turnout rate follows a quadratic 
pattern, with the peak at around 70% (see Figure 16).  
 
Figure 16 Road Expenditure as a Function of District Turnout Rate  
 
Notes: This figure plots the estimated results of column ( 3) in Table 31; each dot represents 
a district.  
 
    Kikuyu_minor_dominant_district  falls around the peak of the fitted quadratic 
line; as explained in column (2) of Table 27, this category of districts received 
the largest share of road expenditure from 1993 to 1997. Notwithstanding the 
fact that the share of swing voters is no longer si gnificant after controlling for 
the turnout rate, it did matter for the allocation of road expenditure. Table  30 
shows selected descriptive statistics for districts where the turnout rate was 
around 70 per cent in the 1992 election. A comparison between the average of 
Panel A and Kalenjin districts reveals that road expenditure is allocated to 
districts with considerably high approval rates, high turnout rates, and a high 
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share of swing voters. This provides evidence that a disproportionate allocation 
of road expenditure may be used as a reward mechanism for mobilizing swing 
voters. In addition, a comparison of the average of Panel B and Kikuyu district 
demonstrates that president Moi also targeted districts with a large share of 
swing voters where the opposition did not have an absolute advantage, which 
may be mobilized in the future.  
 
5.7 Conclusions 
    Infrastructure like roads is considered to be one of the most important 
aspects of basic opportunities since it can help the poor households access to 
markets, schools, health centers etc.  
Empirical findings of this chapter suggest that coethnic districts have 
benefited from ethnic favoritism in terms of road construction expenditure in 
post-independence Kenya. However, the magnitude of favoritism is 
heterogeneous among districts and regime types. In alignment with Burgess et 
al. (2015), this chapter shows that coethnic districts, especially coethnic 
dominant districts, were strongly favored when their coethnics were in power 
during the one-party period, especially for President Moi’s tenure. However, 
this chapter provides further evidence that decreasing ethnic favoritism after 
the arrival of multi-party elections may result in altered targets. During the 5 
years following the 1992 election, President Moi targeted districts with high 
turnout rates as well as high shares of swing voters, which provides supportive 
evidence for the swing voter hypothesis.   
To summarize, between-region inequality in access to infrastructure is due to 
ethnic favoritism as well, which is largely driven by the relative political 
power of different ethnic groups and electoral motivations.  
 109 
 
 
Table 30 Descriptive Statistics on 1992 Election  
Province  District  Approval Rate  Turnout Rate  Margin of Victory Kalenjin Population Share  Swing Voter Share  
Panel A       
Rift-valley Samburu 0.96 0.73 0.92 1.50 95.23 
Rift-valley West Pokot 0.93 0.71 0.89 85.15 10.79 
Eastern Marsabit  0.89 0.66 0.82 0.17 98.70 
Rift-valley Narok 0.81 0.80 0.70 30.41 56.71 
Coast  Kwale  0.77 0.61 0.63 0.10 97.69 
Coast  Taita 0.67 0.61 0.52 0.16 95.89 
Western Busia  0.65 0.65 0.48 0.50 92.92 
Rift-valley Uasin Gishu 0.66 0.73 0.39 52.63 25.45 
Coast  Lamu 0.55 0.70 0.37 0.31 71.30 
Rift-valley Kajiado 0.59 0.74 0.36 0.52 72.59 
Eastern Kitui  0.42 0.65 0.06 0.03 99.53 
Average  
District Above  0.72 0.69 0.56 15.59 74.25 
Kalenjin  0.90 0.81 0.83 78.20 12.90 
Kalenjin Dominant  0.95 0.83 0.91 85.73 7.78 
Kalenjin Minor Dominant  0.81 0.77 0.66 63.14 23.13 
      (Continued)  
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Table 30:(Continued)  
Province  District  Approval Rate  Turnout Rate  Margin of Victory Kalenjin Population Share  Swing Voter Share  
Panel B       
Rift-valley Trans Nzoia 0.34 0.69 −0.10 21.29 66.60 
Western Kakamega 0.41 0.64 −0.11 0.96 95.90 
Western Bungoma 0.23 0.71 −0.24 9.77 87.94 
Rift-valley Nakuru 0.24 0.74 −0.33 14.98 18.11 
Eastern Embu 0.11 0.74 −0.47 0.07 94.17 
Rift-valley Laikipia  0.19 0.73 −0.51 7.25 23.96 
Eastern Meru 0.21 0.72 −0.52 0.05 98.45 
Nyanza  South Nyanza  0.09 0.72 −0.80 0.06 23.31 
Nyanza  Kisumu 0.04 0.73 −0.89 0.66 9.31 
Nyanza  Siaya 0.02 0.75 −0.95 0.08 4.10 
Average  
District Above  0.19 0.72 −0.49 5.52 52.19 
Kikuyu 0.08 0.81 −0.68 3.37 9.14 
Kikuyu Dominant  0.02 0.84 −0.78 0.28 4.38 
Kikuyu Minor Dominant  0.21 0.73 −0.42 11.12 21.04 
Notes: This table includes those districts whose turnout rate was between 60 and 80% in the 1992 election. These districts ar e divided into two 
panels: panel A shows districts with a positive margin of victory, whereas panel B shows districts with a  negative margin of victory. The 
average of each panel is calculated separately and then compared with Kalenjin and  Kikuyu districts,  respectively.  
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Chapter 6 Summary and Policy Implications 
    Using selected indicators on education and access to basic public goods and 
services, this dissertation shows that the overall developmental outcomes as 
well as inequality measures  have been improved in the past several decades  in 
Kenya. The majority of the inequality is  increasingly coming from within-
region inequality; between-region inequality has barely improved . 
    Previous studies find that inequality is  negatively associated with poverty 
reduction, economic development as well as the stability of a country.  Kenya 
has experienced quite bloody episodes of ethnic conflict since its independence, 
and the conflict that raged in the aftermath of the 2007 election in Kenya 
remains vivid in many people’s minds, raising questions that whether it is 
related to the inequality in Kenya.  
    Using the Uppsala Conflict Data Program Geo-referenced Dataset, this 
dissertation identifies the causal effect of drought on intrastate conflict through 
a panel data analysis.  It also explores a drought-conflict nexus conditional on 
baseline measurement of social-economic factors and social divisions . The 
empirical results show that the drought -conflict nexus is conditional, with its 
strength substantially affected by the baseline measurement of access  to 
unimproved water source, the ownership of land and social divisions at the 
local level. Comparing the baseline measurements of access to improved water 
source with that in the 2014 KDHS reveal s the fact that between-region 
inequality is barely improved, and regions with higher inequality have 
experienced more conflict. Between-region inequality may also enhance the 
drought-conflict nexus since non-state conflict increases in a certain district 
when its neighboring districts were hit by drought especially in arid area. Thus, 
policy interventions aimed to reduce the within-region as well as between-
region inequalities are urgently needed. 
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    One striking feature of the regions in Kenya is that every region has a 
dominant ethnic group. The post -independence presidents allocated resources 
in a way that favored their home regions or their own ethnic groups ( Oucho 
2002). While it is not clear whether the better developmenta l outcomes in 
certain regions are because the president only favors  his own ethnic groups 
who are concentrated in certain regions or because he favors certain regions as 
a whole.  
    Thus, given that education sector occupies the single largest expenditure 
share of the government account since independence, this disserta tion then 
explores whether inequality in educational outcomes can be attributed to ethnic 
favoritism and whether ethnic favoritism operates at the district level or ethnic 
dimension. The estimated results in Chapter 4 show that ethnic favoritism 
operates at the district level, from both supply-side and demand-side 
mechanism. The supply-side mechanism of ethnic favoritism implies  that 
inequality in educational outcomes may come from inequality in opportunities 
since coethnic districts are more likely to get educational resources. In addition, 
ethnic favoritism in the job market affects the demand -side mechanism of 
education, which implies that inequality in educational outcomes may come 
from different choice and effort because  of inequality in employment 
opportunities.  
    Following education, road sector is the second largest expenditure item in 
government expenditure. Thus, Chapter 5 focuses on road expenditure, finding 
that coethnic districts of the president get a disproportionate share of 
expenditures. The advent of the multi-party election failed to prevent the 
president from discriminating other districts since more road expenditure went 
to districts with higher shares of turnout rates and swing voters.  These results 
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reflect that there is  systematic inequality in the provision of basic opportunities 
like roads. 
    Caution is needed when interpreting the results about ethnic favoritism in 
Chapter 4 and 5, especially the supply-side mechanisms in relation to ethnic 
favoritism. A disproportionate allocation of resources does not necessarily 
reflect decision-making of the president. A possible channel connecting the 
ethnicity of the president and the disproportionate share of resources in his 
coethnic district could be through the education or public works ministers 
purposely diverting more resources to coethnic districts of the president to seek 
the president’s favor. This consideration goes beyond the scope of this 
dissertation and is left for future research to explore.   
    Based on the evidence displayed above, what kind of policy implication s can 
be generated to further reduce the inequality in Kenya, especially inequality in 
basic opportunities?  
    The results in Chapter 3 indicate that between-region inequality in access to 
improved water may enhance the drought -conflict nexus especially in arid areas; 
conflict is more likely to break out in areas where more households have no 
land or are relying on unimproved water source when hit by drought. Thus , the 
government or the development community can help to  improve basic water 
source through providing rainwater harvesting facilities in arid areas and to 
provide job opportunities to landless workers through developing labor-
intensive industries, which are expected to decrease their motivations and 
increase their opportunity cost of engaging in conflicts.  
    Besides, the estimated results in Chapter 4 and 5 disclose that coethnic 
districts of the president have received more resources  and opportunities in 
terms of education and road construction. Thus, inequality in outcomes in 
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Kenya is largely coming from inequality in opportunities, which is deeply 
driven by the relative political power of different ethnic groups.  
    Then how can we break the links between inequality in outcomes like 
education and inequality in opportunity? From the supply-side mechanism of 
education, the development community or the government can provide 
educational resources in unfavored regions to cut down inequality in 
opportunity coming from the unequal provision of public goods. From the 
demand-side mechanism of education, they can implement policies like 
conditional income transfers to improve the incentive of the househo lds in the 
non-coethnic district to invest in their children’s human capital. Alternatively, 
the government needs to provide equal job opportunities  to different ethnic 
groups through introducing civil service examinations to increase their 
expectations of educational returns . Besides, the government or the 
development community can also help to implement transparency reform in the 
allocation of public expenditure and in the process of public sector employment 
to reduce the inequality of opportunities in Kenya.      
    This dissertation only looks at ethnic favoritism in education and road  
sectors in Kenya, it is highly likely that a similar phenomenon happens in other 
sectors as well. It would be interesting to compare the  situation of ethnic 
favoritism in different countries  and different sectors under the similar 
political institution and to explore whether ethnic favoritism happens in other 
countries as well. If it did happen, in which sector it is most significant and 
why there are county-level differences in terms of the demonstration of ethnic 
favoritism. 
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Appendix 1  Robustness Checks Using Wild Cluster Bootstrap, Table 7  
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Outcome Variable  Non-State Conflict  
 
Full sample  Humid Semi-Arid  Arid  Full sample  Humid Semi-Arid  Arid  
SPEI3 Drought,  Long Rainy  -0.673** -0.483 0.008 -0.575 -0.521** -0.623 0.029 -0.796 
 
(0.015) (0.115) (0.900) (0.400) (0.045) (0.270) (0.705) (0.325) 
SPEI3 Drought,  Long Rainy  
    
-0.322* 0.312 -0.060 0.479 
in Neighboring District  
    
(0.060) (0.545) (0.640) (0.120) 
     
Year Fixed Effect  Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
District Fixed Effect  Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
District Linear Time Trend  N N N N N N N N 
         
R-squared 0.302 0.197 0.113 0.393 0.302 0.198 0.113 0.394 
Number of Districts  41 19 13 9 41 19 13 9 
Note: This table shows robustness checks of Table 7 using wild cluster bootstrap by Cameron et al.  (2008) with 400 replications to calculate standard errors.  
P-values are shown in parentheses. *,  **,  and *** respectively denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 per cent levels.  
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  Appendix 2 Robustness Checks Using Wild Cluster Bootstrap, Table 8 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Outcome Variable  Non-State Conflict  One-Sided Violence  
 Full Sample  Humid ASA Full Sample  Humid ASA 
SPEI6 Drought,  Long Rainy  -0.458** -0.361 -0.459 
   
 
(0.035) (0.255) (0.160) 
   Share of Unimproved Water Sources*  0.938* 0.299 1.375* 
   SPEI6 Drought Rainy Season  (0.055) (0.650) (0.085) 
   SPEI3 Drought Long Rainy 
   
-0.219** -0.102 0.020 
    
(0.020) (0.893) (0.390) 
Share of Landless People*  
   
2.324*** 2.626*** -0.047 
SPEI3 Drought Long Rainy 
   
(0.000) (0.000) (0.615) 
       Year Fixed Effect  Y Y Y Y Y Y 
District Fixed Effect  Y Y Y Y Y Y 
District Linear Time Trend  N N N N N N 
       
Observations  918 513 405 918 513 405 
R-squared 0.119 0.192 0.150 0.152 0.214 0.141 
Number of Districts  34 19 15 34 19 15 
Note: This table shows robustness checks of Table 8 using wild cluster bootstrap by Cameron et al.  (2008) 
with 400 replications to  calculate standard errors. P -values are shown in parentheses. *,  **,  and *** 
respectively denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 per cent levels.  
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Appendix 3 Robustness Checks using Wild Cluster Bootstrap 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Outcome Variable  Years of Primary Schooling  Primary Completion  
Coethnic  0.194 -0.027 -0.027 0.040*** 0.014 0.014 
 
(0.38) (0.81) (0.73) (0.00) (0.37) (0.10) 
Coethnic District  
 
0.115 0.115 
 
0.039** 0.039*** 
  
(0.30) (0.56) 
 
(0.01) (0.00) 
       Observations  85,750 43,898 43,898 85,750 43,898 43,898 
R-squared 0.326 0.393 0.393 0.152 0.208 0.208 
Note: This table shows robustness checks using wild cluster bootstrap by Cameron et al.  
(2008) with 400 replications to calculate standard errors. P -values are shown in parentheses.  
Columns (1) and (4) replicate the estimated results of  columns (7) and (14) of Table 15 ;  
standard errors are clustered at the ethnic group level.  Columns (2),  (3),  (5) and (6) re plicate 
the estimated results of columns (4),  (5),  (9) and (1 0) of Table 16; standard errors of 
columns (2) and (5) are clustered at the district level while in columns (3) and (6),  they are 
clustered at the province level.  *,  **,  and *** respectively denote significance at the 10, 5, 
and 1 per cent levels.  
 
 132 
 
 
Appendix 4  Robustness Checks of Table 17 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Outcome Variable  Years of Primary Schooling  Primary Completion  
Threshold (per cent)  30 50 70 90 30 50 70 90 
Panel A         
Coethnic District  0.095 0.130 0.127 -0.029 0.049*** 0.052*** 0.055*** 0.074*** 
 
(0.177) (0.181) (0.240) (0.254) (0.004) (0.001)  (0.004) (0.020) 
         Observations  43,898 43,898 43,898 43,898 43,898 43,898 43,898 43,898 
R-squared 0.393 0.393 0.393 0.392 0.208 0.208 0.208 0.208 
Panel B 
        Coethnic District  0.109 0.116 0.166 0.011 0.054*** 0.055*** 0.063*** 0.081** 
 
(0.163) (0.159) (0.238) (0.266) (0.002) (0.002)  (0.004) (0.023) 
Local Minority  0.395 0.110 0.526 0.865*** 0.088* 0.061 0.084 0.129** 
 
(0.269) (0.306) (0.306) (0.171) (0.038) (0.042)  (0.053) (0.043) 
Coethnic District*Local Minority  -0.073 0.095 -0.336*** -0.640** -0.026* -0.018 -0.068*** -0.128 
 
(0.145) (0.128) (0.078) (0.207) (0.013) (0.019)  (0.012) (0.074) 
         Observations  43,898 43,898 43,898 43,898 43,898 43,898 43,898 43,898 
R-squared 0.393 0.393 0.393 0.393 0.208 0.208 0.208 0.208 
Note: KDHS 2014 is used for estimation. Standard errors clustered at the province level  are shown in parentheses.  *,  **,  and *** denote 
significance at the 10 per cent level,  5 per cent level,  and 1 per cent level,  respectively. All the specifications control for ethnicity fixed effect,  
district fixed effect,  year  fixed effect,  dummies of religion, female as well as childhood in rural areas.  
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Appendix 5  (a) Summary Statistics,  KDHS 1993 -2014 
Variable Name   Obs.  Mean Std.  Dev. Min Max 
Survey Year  88,744 2007.363 7.647 1993 2014 
Birth Year  88,744 1978.525 12.358 1939 1999 
Cohort 88,744 1984.525 12.358 1945 2005 
Period 88,744 4.360 1.277 1 6 
Province  88,744 4.572 1.893 1 8 
Female Dummy 88,744 0.711 0.453 0 1 
Catholic Dummy 88,744 0.232 0.422 0 1 
Protest Dummy 88,744 0.622 0.485 0 1 
Muslim Dummy 88,744 0.113 0.317 0 1 
Childhood in Rural  88,744 0.525 0.499 0 1 
Primary Completion  88,744 0.579 0.494 0 1 
Years of Primary Schooling  88,744 6.108 2.653 0 8 
Years of Primary Schooling Initial Condition  88,744 3.763 0.627 3.189 4.856 
Primary Completion Initial Condition  88,744 0.316 0.078 0.222 0.466 
Kikuyu Dummy 88,744 0.178 0.383 0 1 
Kalenjin Dummy 88,744 0.130 0.336 0 1 
Ethnicity 88,744 3.933 1.940 1 6 
Coethnic  88,744 0.144 0.351 0 1 
Kenyatta Regime Dummy 88,744 0.262 0.440 0 1 
Moi Regime Dummy 88,744 0.613 0.487 0 1 
Kibaki Regime Dummy 88,744 0.125 0.330 0 1 
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Appendix 5  (b)  Summary Stat i st ics ,  KDHS 2014  
Variab le Name  Obs.  Mean  Std .  Dev.  Min  Max 
Survey Year  43,898  2014  0 2014  2014  
Bir th  Year  43,898  1984.726  9.883  1960  1999  
Cohort  43,898  1990.726  9.883  1966  2005  
Period  35,009  4.707  0.928  3 6 
Female Dummy 43,898  0.708  0.455  0 1 
Catholic Dummy 43,898  0.204  0.403  0 1 
Protes t  Dummy 43,898  0.639  0.480  0 1 
Muslim Dummy 43,898  0.130  0.337  0 1 
Chi ldhood in Rura l   43,898  0.237  0.425  0 1 
Primary Complet ion  43,898  0.613  0.487  0 1 
Years  of  Primary Schooling  43,898  6.353  2.625  0 8 
Years  of  Primary Schooling In it ia l  Condi t ion  43,898  2.567  1.261  0.184  5.045  
Primary Complet ion  In it ia l  Condi t ion  43,898  0.247  0.137  0.016  0.625  
Popula t ion Share of  Dominant  Ethnici ty  43,898  74.728  21.808  27.910  98.230  
Kiku yu Dis t rict  43,898  0.178  0.382  0 1 
Kalen jin  Dist r ic t  43,898  0.149  0.356  0 1 
Kiku yu Dummy 43,898  0.163  0.369  0 1 
Kalen jin  Dummy 43,898  0.140  0.347  0 1 
Ethnici ty  43,898  4.015  1.941  1 6 
Coethnic  43,898  0.143  0.350  0 1 
Coethnic Dist r ic t   43,898  0.155  0.362  0 1 
Coethnic Dist r ic t  (share>50)  43,898  0.146  0.353  0 1 
Coethnic Dist r ic t  (share>70)  43,898  0.115  0.318  0 1 
Coethnic Dist r ic t  (share>90)  43,898  0.040  0.196  0 1 
Local  Minori ty in Coethnic  Dist r ict  43,898  0.078  0.268  0 1 
Local  Minori ty in Coethnic  Dist r ict  (share>50)  43,898  0.056  0.231  0 1 
Local  Minori ty in Coethnic  Dist r ict  (share> 70)  43,898  0.029  0.168  0 1 
Local  Minori ty in Coethnic  Dist r ict  (share>90)  43,898  0.006  0.078  0 1 
Kenyat ta  Regime Dummy 43,898  0.109  0.311  0 1 
Moi  Regime Dummy 43,898  0.650  0.477  0 1 
Kibaki  Regime Dummy 43,898  0.241  0.428  0 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 135 
 
Appendix 5  (c) Summary Statistics,  2009 Census  
Variable Name Obs. Mean Std. Dev.  Min Max 
Survey Year  3,841,935 2009 0 2009 2009 
Birth Year  3,841,935 1986.983 18.303 1914 2009 
Age 3,841,935 22.017 18.303 0 95 
Female Dummy 3,841,935 0.504 0.500 0 1 
Education Attainment  3,841,935 1.639 1.420 0 9 
Public Sector Job Dummy 3,841,935 0.019 0.136 0 1 
Population Share of Dominant Ethnicity  3,841,935 74.907 22.327 27.910 98.230 
Kikuyu District  3,841,935 0.247 0.431 0 1 
Kalenjin District  3,841,935 0.118 0.323 0 1 
Districtcode 3,841,935 20.543 10.880 1 41 
Coethnic District (age>18)  3,841,935 0.184 0.388 0 1 
Coethnic District (age>20)  3,841,935 0.191 0.393 0 1 
Coethnic District (age>22)  3,841,935 0.197 0.398 0 1 
Coethnic District (age>24)  3,841,935 0.205 0.404 0 1 
Coethnic District (age>26)  3,841,935 0.210 0.407 0 1 
Coethnic District (age>18 & Share>50)  3,841,935 0.136 0.343 0 1 
Coethnic District (age>20 & Share>50)  3,841,935 0.138 0.345 0 1 
Coethnic District (age>22 & Share>50)  3,841,935 0.141 0.348 0 1 
Coethnic District (age>24 & Share>50)  3,841,935 0.144 0.351 0 1 
Coethnic District (age>26 & Share>50)  3,841,935 0.146 0.353 0 1 
Coethnic District (age>18 & Share>70)  3,841,935 0.094 0.292 0 1 
Coethnic District (age>20 & Share>70)  3,841,935 0.096 0.294 0 1 
Coethnic District (age>22 & Share>70)  3,841,935 0.097 0.296 0 1 
Coethnic District (age>24 & Share>70)  3,841,935 0.099 0.299 0 1 
Coethnic District (age>26 & Share>70)  3,841,935 0.100 0.300 0 1 
Coethnic District (age>18 & Share>90)  3,841,935 0.047 0.212 0 1 
Coethnic District (age>20 & Share>90)  3,841,935 0.049 0.216 0 1 
Coethnic District (age>22 & Share>90)  3,841,935 0.050 0.219 0 1 
Coethnic District (age>24 & Share>90)  3,841,935 0.053 0.224 0 1 
Coethnic District (age>26 & Share>90)  3,841,935 0.054 0.226 0 1 
 
 
 
